• M & C Bty RHA
• 11th Hussars1st KRRC
• 2nd RB
• Section RASC and RAOC
• Support Group under command Brigadier Gott. Role – To act as covering force to concentration of remainder of 7th Armd Div.

The Regt returned to MAADI at 1530 hrs 1st May after 2 days long exercises. The remainder of the day and the whole night was spent in preparing to move.
On 2nd May the Regt moved out at 0500 hrs leaving behind untrained Yeomanry and some Rhodesians, with officers and NCOs as instructors, all of whom went to RAC Base Depot for training.
21 Rhodesians proceeded with the Regt as DRs and drivers of Ford Pick-ups.
On 3rd May the Regt arrived at its destination, having completely mobilised and marched 330 miles in 41 hours. Breakdowns on the whole were light, especially on the second day. Complete wireless silence was enforced during the march which rendered road control difficult especially as there were so few DRs available.

May 14th 1940. The role of the Sqn at SIDI BARRANI was:-

1. Protection of the dump (rations and petrol) at SIDI BARRANI.
2. Escorting of RASC supply columns in the construction of a dump (rations, water and petrol) at BIR DIGNAISH.

1. Advance towards SIDI BARRANI.
2. Endeavour to capture the dumps at BIR DIGNAISH and SIDI BARRANI.

The role of the 11th Hussars was:-

1. To prevent Coy 1st Btn KRRC at BIR DIGNAISH from being surprised and cover their withdrawal if necessary.
2. To delay any Italian advance on BIR DIGNAISH from FORT MADDALENA.
3. To delay any Italian advance on BUQ-BUQ from SOLLUM.

Tasks a) and b) were allotted to B Sqn, task c) to C Sqn.
C Sqn (less troop at SOLLUM) went to a point 10 miles West of BUQ-BUQ on the SOLLUM – SIDI BARRANI road, placing Troops on the Summer and Winter tracks. B Sqn went to BIR DIGNAISH and formed a protective screen 25 miles long to the West of the dump.

The object was to dominate the frontier between CAPUZZO and MADDALENA. It was considered inadvisable to cut the wire North of the track junction about 3 miles South of BIR WAIR as it was not the intention to attract the AMSHAT Garrison’s attention. B Sqn, less two Troops which were left in close observation at BIR DIGNAISH, were given inclusive SIDI OMAR northwards, A Sqn exclusive SIDI OMAR to inclusive MADDALENA. The places suggested for penetration were as follows:-

• one to the North of SIDI OMAR,
• one between SIDI OMAR and SHEFERZEN,
• one further South,
• one just North of MADDALENA.

The Troops arrived at the frontier as the light was failing. Wireless was restricted to a minimum and no reports were received until morning. A Sqn penetrated in all three places without opposition. The Southern Troop under TSM Clarke fired at a lorry going North, bullets from the Bren gun were seen to strike and flash, but it was obviously armoured. Two machine guns from MADDALENA fired on this Troop during the night without effect. The Troops withdrew to observation during the morning, this side of the frontier.

The Troop under 2Lt JW Poston further North, had an enemy aeroplane repeatedly circle over it, it came lower, was fired on, and immediately flew away.

The wire presented no obstacle and was easily cut and dragged away with a tow rope, the posts were either knocked down or towed away, in which case the concrete base was removed. The B Sqn northern Troop penetrated and saw vehicle lights but had no opportunity for action. The southern Troop under TSM Howarth penetrated just North of SIDI OMAR and remained in observation until about 0600 hrs when he recced the 2 SIDI OMAR posts. He was fired on by desultory rifle fire, from trenches on the northern flank of SIDI OMAR and later retired through the wire.

B Sqn HQ under Major AG Miller with two cars only, had remained to guard the gap for the southern Troop’s retirement. At about 0200 hrs, a truck with lights containing 4 men, passed Sqn HQ moving South but got by. At 0800 hrs Sqn HQ moved North a mile to recce a derelict Post. While doing so, two trucks and two lorries were seen proceeding South about a mile to the West, Sqn HQ advanced immediately. The enemy then halted and dismounted. Some lay down and fired. The two trucks were empty except for the drivers. One of the lorries with 3 or 4 men in it made off and got away. The remainder after having fired a few shots and having been persuaded by their officers, lay down their arms. It is estimated that 3 of the enemy were killed. Two officers and 68 ORs, 5 of whom were wounded, were taken prisoner, together with 9 Breda automatics, 60 or 70 rifles (1918 Briesca), carbines and much ammunition also 3 haversacks full of very modern light hand grenades loaded with HE and thin outer cases. The Sqn then retired East of the wire to rest.

Later a Troop under Sgt Bowyer, returned to the northern gap where it found recently removed earth and immediately realised that the ground had been mined. He fired at the mines (10) with no result, he then extended the gap in the wire, to allow a troop which was following, to penetrate. He then removed the 10 mines, laid them in a pile, poured petrol on them, laid a trail of petrol which he set alight with a verey light and then withdrew immediately. The crater caused by the explosion was very large and believed large enough to contain an Armd car. During this operation,, which had spread over a long period, an enemy plane made two dive bombing and machine gunning attacks with no effect. During the second attack, a Bren gun was brought to bear on the plane by the Troop Ldr whilst his other car was being attacked. The plane flew away after a slight wobbling in the air and appeared to make a forced landing at CAPUZZO, about 4 miles away, no further attacks were made.

Upon receiving instructions to operate North of CAPUZZO, one Troop under 2Lt Halliday, were given orders to pass through the northern gap, skirt West of CAPUZZO and endeavour to observe the CAPUZZO – BARDIA road. As he arrived on the SIDI AZEIZ road, his steering tube broke. A lorry had been approaching from SIDI AZEIZ. It halted 200 yards away and was fired on and captured. It was decided to return, and whilst fixing the steering of the MARC, towing arrangements were made. An AC was sent forward for East flank protection. This car saw 2 field guns clearly, about 1,500 yds range due North of CAPUZZO. He was surprised they did not fire and to ensure the Troop getting away, he took no action. The captured lorry was a 10 ton Lancia, diesel engine. The Troop, with the Lancia being driven by one of the AC personnel and the MARC (broken steering) on tow, returned without further incident and was replaced by another Troop which got astride the CAPUZZO – BARDIA road. Nothing came along this road so the troop withdrew, having been given orders to be back in camp before dark. All possible telephone wires were cut throughout.

At 0800 hrs 13th June, 1Tp (2Lt JW Poston), 2Tp (2Lt CJ Spickernell) and 3Tp (Lt Friend) formed up to approach the Fort. 2 & 3Tp went through the gap in the wire which had previously been cut. 1Tp remained on the South side. The Western fort was attacked first and found to be unoccupied. Fort showed signs of recent occupation. They were then set on fire and destroyed. Lt Friend was in command the Troop carrying out the operation. The Sqn then withdrew 2 ½ miles East leaving 5Tp (TSM Woodward) in observation.

1100 – A force consisting of 11th Hussars (less 2 Sqns), one Sqn 7th Hussars (Lt DG Seymour Evans) consisting of Cruiser and light tanks and one troop A/Tk guns RHA, all under Lt Col Combe, attacked and destroyed enemy force. Appendix O

One troop B Sqn (TSM Howarth) escorted a detachment of RE’s to the wire and to FORT CAPUZZO to carry out further demolitions.

RHQ, C & B Sqns moved their positions about 2 miles to the NW. One troop of B Sqn (TSM Howath) escorted a detachment of RE’s to the wire and FORT CAPUZZO to complete demolitions.

Patrol by B Sqn (2Lt Dier) to SIDI AZEIZ.
At 1800 hrs patrol reached SIDI AZEIZ from the SW. A bomber was seen stationary on the aerodrome and thinking that the place must still be held, the patrol worked further West. Four concrete gun emplacements with corrugated roofs covered with earth were seen. These showed signs of rapid evacuation, since a number of SA rounds were left lying about. Patrol then moved North until it arrived on the edge of the aerodrome. Another aeroplane, a fighter, which had previously been hidden by the bomber, was seen. The fighter took off but took no hostile action.

The patrol moved back to a position SE of the fort and then moved towards the fort. Traces of A/Tk mines having been removed were seen. The patrol got within 100 yards of the fort without being fired upon, so then dashed into the walls and discovered that the fort was empty. 2Lt Dier and a NCO went inside. The walls were 7 to 8 feet high and about 18 inches thick. There was nothing there except about a dozen empty water bottles. The fort showed no signs of being hit by bombs but there were two burnt out lorries close by. The patrol turned its attention to the aeroplane and after shooting at it from 700 yards, they went right up to it and set it on fire. The plane was completely burnt. There was also a fake aeroplane on the landing ground.

At 0945 hrs, the troop was in observation South of EL GUBI.
At 1110 hrs, a message was received that the MARC was wrecked. The crew were safe and the other cars had dispersed.
At 1120 hrs, 3Tp (2Lt Halliday) was sent to EL GUBI to help.
At 1145 hrs, a message was received from 2Tp saying that they were being attacked by land forces, that they could not move and required help. This was the last message received from the Troop.
At 1340 hrs, 3Tp arrived at EL GUBI but could find no trace of 2Tp.

C Sqn on recce towards GIARRABUB found a small fort on the wire 20 miles North of GIARRABUB occupied by the enemy.
A sqn still resting at FORT MADDALENA. RHQ in same position.

C Sqn moved their HQ 3 miles South of GARET EL GELEB. Sgt Whitehouse’s Troop and a section of KRR patrolled South down the wire track. After going 10 miles, they met an MG post held by the enemy. An attack was made but the enemy got away under cover of dead ground. They left a lot of ammo and clothing behind. From this post, the fort at GIARRABUB could be clearly seen 4 or 5 miles to the South. To the East of it there appeared to be a landing ground. The tomb of the ??? was also clearly visible. There also appeared to be one other MG post round the outside of the oasis. They remained in observation all night and patrolled down to the landing ground. No enemy movement seen.

A Sqn (2Lt Poston’s Tp) reported EL GUBI to be a three sided camp. The Tp was fired on the previous night by SA and also came under the rays of searchlights. The RAF reported enemy movement from EL GUBI in the direction of FORT MADDALENA. A Sqn were given the subsidiary task of watching the enemy. TSM Woodward’s Troop was sent to BIR GIBUT. Sqn HQ moved 20 miles NE. TSM Clarke’s reported the located enemy position South of EL GUBI was quiet except for enemy air activity. RAF information appeared false.

RHQ moved back to a position 3 miles West of FORT MADDALENA.

The Sqn Ldr went on to GIARRABUB and met 2Lt Trayner’s troop which was in observation there. On the way Sqn HQ was machine gunned from the air. 2Lt Trayner’s Tp was also bombed and machine gunned. Sgt Lamb’s Tp relieved the Tp in observation. Sqn HQ moved their position 10 miles South. 2Tp (Sgt Mines) was ordered to withdraw to Sqn HQ but owing to breakdown did not get back until 2 days later.

Owing to the intense heat the Sqn HQ was moved back to their original position. At about 1430 hrs they were heavily bombed, about 50 being dropped. One AC was slightly damaged.

A Sqn.
3Tp (Lt Friend) in observation East of EL GUBI, found Cpl Emery, Cpl Price, LCpl Blackmore and Tpr Spencer & Tpr Driver of B Sqn and one RRAC in area TAIEB EL ESSEM. These men belonged to TSM Howarth’s Tp which had been missing since June 21st. Cpl Emery and LCpl Blackmore were wounded.
EL GUBI area reported quiet.
RHQ – 5 aircraft dive bombed FORT MADDALENA at 0830 hrs, many of the bombs did not explode.

A Sqn
Owing to intense heat and shortage of water, the Sqn withdrew to near FORT MADDALENA leaving TSM Woodward in observation of EL GUBI. The Sqn moved in the evening to BIR SHEFERZEN. TSM Clarke’s Tp went forward to a position on the EL GUBI – GIARRABUB road.

A Sqn.

Sqn HQ bombed. Lts Poston and Spickernell’s troops in observation of EL GUBI. NTR.Information received from a captured Italian pilot revealed that TSM Howarth and 3 crew members were prisoners and had been flown directly to Marshal BALBO. They were safe and unhurt. The only man now missing from that troop is Tpr Jones ’70.

A Sqn.
Two troops in observation EL GUBI, 2Lt Poston and 2Lt Spickernell. The former was bombed otherwise NTR. Sqn HQ moved 16 miles SW. Sqn B Echelon bombed, no casualties.

A Sqn
Patrols in observation at EL GUBI. B Echelon again bombed. Tpr Muscatelli whom was 2nd driver of a lorry which was towing a broken down RRAC, was wounded.

RHQ
FORT MADDALENA was bombed by four aircraft at 1800 hrs, no damage.

From June 20th to 29th, the Regt was operating on a front 120 miles long, ie. From SIDI AZEIZ in the North to GIARRABUB in the South.

This made supplies and communications very difficult. RHQ were near FORT MADDALENA. The B2 and B2/A Echelons had to go back to BIR HABATA to replenish. This entailed a journey of 50 miles each way. Added to this. C Sqn HQ were 60 miles away from RHQ. Their forward troops were a further 20 miles in front of their HQ.

This meant they were 130 miles away from the replenishing point. The other Sqns were in the same situation, A Sqn being near TIEB EL ESSEM 60 miles away from RHQ with Troops near EL GUBI and B sqn being at SHEFERZEN 30 miles away from RHQ with Troops at SIDI AZEIZ.

In order to maintain these Sqns, the echelons were often travelling throughout the night. Supplies were not the only difficulty. Owing to the great distance speech on the wireless was impossible and even Key was very bad at times. The weather during this period was very hot and there were frequent sandstorms.

It was usually impossible to operate between 1000 and 1600 hrs. If RRAC [Rolls Royce Armd Car] were used during the heat of the day they boiled and used large quantities of water. Water was very short and it was only by supplementing the ration by sending to SIWA, SOLLUM and SOFAFI for extra water that enough was obtained.

Combe force crossed the frontier at 0700 hrs and proceeded NW to SIDI AZEIZ. At 0800 hrs C Sqn acting as advance guard came under heavy shellfire on reaching a point 3 to 4 miles South of SIDI AZEIZ. Estimated number of enemy guns; 9 to 15, appeared to be situated in the proximity of SIDI AZEIZ. C Sqn proceeded round to the West and B Sqn proceeded to the East. One Sqn 7th Hussars and Force HQ followed eastern Sqn. Both Sqns TIVI were drawing arty fire during this flank movement. Enemy Infantry position was located on the ridge astride road running SE from SIDI AZEIZ. 1 Sqn 7th Hussars put in an attack on this position. The enemy (native troops approx 50) fled. The 7th Hussars Sqn pursued but on reaching summit of ridge encountered a minefield. Three light tanks were blown up. Casualties were one OR killed, two ORs wounded. The tanks were subsequently stripped and burnt.

The Sqn TIVI proceeding round to the West was fired on by automatic MGs from B. BU TABEL. Owing to the flat nature of the ground and mirage, it was impossible to locate gun position. An attempt was made by 1 troop 4th RHA to shell SIDI AZEIZ from a point about 12,000 yards to the South but owing to lack of observation this was not successful. The spotting was carried out by TIVI.

The two Sqns TIVI proceeded to the NE and NW of SIDI AZEIZ and one troop took up a position B. EL HAQHEIFA. Although still drawing arty fire it was still impossible to locate the gun position. At approx 1500 hrs a large enemy bomber was seen to land at SIDI AZEIZ. At approx 1630 hrs, Combe Force withdrew, less one Sqn and one troop TIVI. Sqn TIVI proceeded to Pt. 41 and sent patrol to Pt. 132 on BARDIA – TOBRUK road. No enemy movement was seen.

Sqn withdrew and on passing SIDI AZEIZ, the Fort was seen to be in flames and a white flag was hoisted from the area of the Fort. The Sqn advanced and when within about ¼ mile, it encountered very heavy arty fire and then withdrew. Previous to this, 1 Tp TIVI at B. EL HAQHEIFA had observed a lorry enter SIDI AZEIZ by the BARDIA road, and return a short time after. This troop then withdrew SW on observing 24 enemy light tanks approaching him. Six of these tanks pursued him which he engaged capturing one of them. The Tp Ldr burnt the tank and took the crew of two, prisoners.

Meanwhile the Sqn withdrawing East encountered 9 enemy light tanks which pursued them. These were beaten off on reaching the frontier. Previous to the above, 1 troop TIVI proceeded to Pt. 177 East of SIDI AZEIZ. They approached BARDIA defences and saw Infantry dug in positions. Considerable enemy movement at B. SALEH EL GASSUM. The going NW and North of SIDI AZEIZ is hummocky and very slow.

At about 1020 hrs 2Tp (2Lt Spickernell) and 5Tp (TSM Woodward) under command 2Lt Spickernell, assembled at SHEGGA opposite to the cut in the wire. 1Tp (2Lt Poston) and 3Tp (Lt Friend) concentrated in area North of Pt. 177. Both parties advanced simultaneously and the white flag was hoisted in the fort. 18 POWs were taken (5 Italians). The wireless was destroyed. Some MGs were taken away. The Sqn withdrew 4 miles.

5Tp (TSM Woodward) returned at 1400 hrs to collect a wounded native and the rest of the MGs. While they and the transport were in the fort collecting water, 3 of our own bombers appeared and bombed the fort. This time they hit it but the Tp scattered and luckily no damage or casualties were caused to out own troops.

Situation on the morning of 16th:-
A Sqn 80 miles to SW and 40 miles West of the frontier watching the GIARRABUB road.
C Sqn (less one troop at SOLLUM under Divisional orders) were operating on the TOBRUK road and other roads East to BARDIA.
B Sqn resting in bivouac area QUARET ABU FAYRES, less two troops under 2Lt WVH Gape and 2Lt Dier, on wire patrol SOLLUM – SIDI OMAR. 1 troop ordered to CAPUZZO to collect Mussolini statue between 0800 and 1000 hrs.

Owing to the late arrival of the rations on the evening of 14/15th, it had not been possible to deliver them to C Sqn and consequently they would have to be sent under escort this morning to Sqn HQ, which was a few miles South of TOBRUK road. I considered that B sqn could rest as well 5 miles North of the frontier as 10 miles South, and orders were given to this effect.

At 0730 hrs B Sqn were within a mile or two of the frontier when 2Lt Gape saw a force estimated at 12 light tanks and 30 MET, moving North at 502367, and received orders from Major AG Miller to try and cut them off.

Information was then received that 300 Infantry had been seen at 503366 protected by 17 light tanks and 40 MET moving West from that point, and that a second Troop under 2Lt Dier was also in action. This information was passed to Bde with a request for some A/Tk guns, but owing to wireless silence it was not acknowledged and orders were sent to Major Miller to call in all his patrols from the wire and FORT CAPUZZO.

2Lt Gape, although he only had 2 cars, advanced from SE on the column which had 6 light tanks in front and rear, and travelling much faster past the rear guard more or less unobserved, immediately attacked the lorries which halted and dismounted the men. Heavy casualties were inflicted and the tanks attacked. Two were knocked out but he had to retire as they were too numerous for him. Although one car had a slow puncture, he got away and halted. All the tanks came after him and he was not in a good position, as they were trying to surround him, when 1Tp under 2Lt Dier arrived and knocked out one light tank and 2Lt Gape got 2 light tanks. The tanks then withdrew.

A LO from Bde arrived saying that our wireless message had not been received, that also no action had been taken. He was sent back to explain the situation. Information had been received that 7th Hussars Cruiser Sqn and one troop of RHA were on their way up. Owing to B Sqns shortage of cars, 2 from HQ had already been sent, and at 0900 hrs, I decided to go up and see Major Miller. At this moment Colonel Gardener arrived with a message that he would take up protection of the bivouac area and that the remainder of the Bde would be made available if necessary. C sqn were ordered to send their patrol at Pt. 211, South to help piquet enemy from the North.

On meeting Major Miller at GIRBA, we went forward to make a recce together with the comd of the RHA, who had also arrived.

B Sqn had entirely piquetted the enemy and were to keep their patrols well wide and not attack the enemy. The enemy lorries could be clearly seen in the mirage at 503368. Upon returning to conc point at GIRBA, the cruiser Sqn had arrived, strength 4 light tanks and 8 Cruisers, 2 other Cruisers having broken down.

The following plan was explained to all commanders:-
In the absence of cover, the 7th Hussars would attack direct. One troop RHA would move forward, to the right of 7th Hussars, and halt short of the position to engage if possible enemy tanks or lorries breaking to the East towards BARDIA which I considered the most likely direction. The 11th Hussars, as the tanks drew level with them, were to draw wide to the right and left and cut off any retirement. The 7th Hussars advanced about 2 miles, were halted in a dip and all tank commanders shown the objective.

At about 1100 hrs the attack commenced, all Commanders having approved of the plan. One enemy gun soon opened fire at an accurate range, shortly followed by another gun firing at the approaching troop of the RHA, which moved wider to their right and were never under accurate fire again. The 11th Hussars were ordered to press forward on both flanks but not to close in across the Cruisers line of fire. The 7th Hussars were opposed by 7 light tanks which were immediately put out of action and upon approaching the position, went line ahead to the left and encircled the position to the right. By this time 4 guns, one at each corner, were in action. The guns were not silenced until the 7th Hussars had encircled the position 2 or 3 times and ammo lorries were on fire and the crews which had fought very bravely were killed or wounded. The 11th Hussars pursued and destroyed 7 lorries, some ammo and captured about 100 prisoners and 6 lorries. The 4 guns and 1 light tank were towed back to the rendezvous and despatched home together with 7 officers and 94 ORs. The Colonel commanding the force was killed in retirement by the 11th Hussars. It is estimated that 50 had been killed in the action. There were no casualties to our own troops.

This action owed its success to :-

1. The excellent information and prompt action by 2Lt Gape’s Troop.
2. The successful piquetting by B Sqn 11th Hussars.
3. The prompt assembly of suitable reinforcements.
4. Helped by the fact that all tank commanders had seen the objective. The 7th Hussars attack was excellently carried out and most ably led by Lt Seymour Evans.

5. The successful pursuit by B Sqn 11th Hussars.

NOTES. The following points were noted in operations.

1. The great asset of the “signal of the day” which must of a necessity be strictly adhered to.
2. The value of personal recces by commanders and tank commanders, especially when there is a bad mirage.
3. The tendency, probably due to mirage, of opening at too long a range.
4. The value of mobile troops on the flanks.
5. Immobility of the Italian guns to traverse.
6. Owing to the fact that the No. 11 sets of the 7th Hussars could not link to our No. 9 sets, and that the RHA had no wireless at all, the spare sets in this HQ had to be loaned for the second time (SIDI AZEIZ 14th June), a MRAC has had to go in with a tank attack against artillery. The W/T communication in a mixed force is essential.

By dawn 16th June, C Sqn had one Tp (TSM Scrivener) on the TOBRUK road, at the road junction 15 miles NW of SIDI AZEIZ. This troop destroyed telegraph poles, which made a block at this point, and remained in position there. 2Lt Lauder’s troop moved to a position covering the road about 1 ½ miles East of the track.

Sqn HQ remained in position of observation at the top of the escarpment. One troop for protection was left at the top of this first escarpment, 3 miles South to give warning of any movement from SIDI AZEIZ. The other troop still further South at Pt. 211 on the SIDI AZEIZ – EL ADEM road. One troop detailed at SOLLUM under Divisional orders.

At 0210 hrs a column of 30 MET approached from BARDIA and some men carrying rifles could be seen in them. This convoy was signalled by 2Lt Lauder’s troop, which allowed it to pass and then both troops attacked it. Several casualties were inflicted, about 35 surrendered, but 12 to 15 ran away to the North and covered from fire by the lorries, could not be pursued owing to the nature of the ground. The lorries were made immobile. The leading one was an open one with very heavy machine gun of about .5” calibre which was unfortunately damaged. Later 2 staff cars, one containing a General of Engineers (Gen LASTRUCCI) and a captain, approached from TOBRUK and managed to turn around and try to get away. One AC of TSM Scrivener’s Tp chased him down the road, killed the Captain and the two cars halted.

The lorry containing 17 native troops from BARDIA was captured 15 minutes later. About 15 minutes after this, some signallers from BARDIA, in vehicles, came to repair the telephone wire and were killed or captured. At 1410 hrs a staff car containing 3 officers was captured. At 1510 hrs an army truck from BARDIA with 5 Italian women in it was also captured. Empty army lorries from BARDIA and TOBRUK were also captured.

At 1715 hrs a single plane made a very accurate on Sqn HQ Armd cars, diving steeply out of the sun at right angles to the car. He hit the car in 7 places, 4 shots made no impression, 1 punctured a tyre, 1 went through the bedding and sand mats on the back of the car and one split the armoured plate of the turret making a crack about 1 ½ inches long and 1/16 inches wide in the centre.

A total of 3 staff cars, 34 MET and 5 civilian cars were captured and all except 2 lorries, 1 staff car and 1 truck were destroyed. The casualties were 1 officer and 20 ORs killed, 1 General, 9 officers, 78 ORs (incl 17 natives) taken prisoner. Own casualties nil.

No other traffic except 1 MET at 2100 hrs, which was allowed to go as crew were busy repairing a broken down RRAC in close proximity of the road. One Tp was left in observation on North escarpment.

One small fort or blockhouse is reported at Pt. 132 South of main road 3 miles East of track junction; small party of Infantry were seen there at 1600 hrs. There is also a small OP about 200 yds West of the fort. Prisoners were evacuated under escort in Italian lorries captured at the battle of GIRBA in the morning and were despatched with C Sqn rations.

C Sqn, having repaired the broken down car, spare parts being sent during the night from RHQ, returned at dawn leaving one Tp in observation at SIDI AZEIZ. The main TOBRUK road is a first class tarmac road. The other road as marked is non existent. The track running North and South is well defined and good; passes through a defile on the escarpment. The EL ADEM – SIDI AZEIZ road (TRIGH ENVER BRI) is a well defined metalled, but not tarmac, desert road.

After a successful engagement as above, the Sqn was severely handicapped by so many prisoners and it is difficult to know what they would have done had it been necessary for them to disperse or carry on with a task unfinished which necessitated a forward movement.

Dear John,
    Well done, I came to tell you and the Regiment that, the other day, but you were engaged to a better purpose. I came up again today but do not know exactly where you are as you are en route to the vicinity of MADDALENA. You and your chaps have put up a cracking good show. Just what I expected of the old Eleventh. Tommy Pitman and the old files will be jolly pleased with you. I will try and let them know by cable. Good luck to you all and many thanks.

Dick Creagh.

A few days ago I made a thorough search of the ground on which this battle took place. Many lorries etc have been evacuated but amongst the burnt out ones was a large diesel containing arms. I estimated that there were 50 rifles, 8 or 9 light Breda automatics and 1 heavy MG. These I actually counted, but there might easily have been more amongst the debris.

One small Fiat 4 seater car was destroyed by MG and Bren fire. In this car was a full colonel’s coat and operation orders in the pocket, since handed to 4th Armd Bde.

Most of the light tanks had two men in them or lying beside them, the lorries had two and in some cases many more men in them. There was a large number of dead, about 50 including 2 officers, round the position where the guns and lorries were. The Infantry were attacked in the morning by Lt Gape’s Troop at close range, where they had just dismounted from the lorries and were standing in close formation.

Those killed by B Sqn 11th Hussars in pursuit, both brought back and left out, together with those enumerated above, must, in my opinion, have amounted to at least 80 to 100. The number of wounded and captured are of course unaltered.

I then counted all the light tanks and am now able to state that there were definitely 17 destroyed and the number in my original report was wrong. After the action I had no time to check numbers and details of reports but Major Miller was himself uncertain and I did not wish the report to be exaggerated. The numbers are made up as follows:-

5 were destroyed in the morning by 2Lt Gape and 2Lt Dier’s Troops before the main action took place. 4 of these tanks I personally saw on the ground before and after the main action and one other I know was towed from there. These tanks were about 3 miles from the main action and no other unit except B Sqn 11th Hussars were in that area.

At the main gun position there are 2 tanks that never left the close proximity of the 4 guns and ammunition lorries and were undoubtedly destroyed by the 7th Hussar tank action as were 7 others that I personally saw advance from the gun position to meet the 7th Hussars advance. Thus 9 in all were duly accounted for by the 7th Hussars Sqn.

There are also 3 more light tanks that I found about 2 – 2½ miles further off in the line of the enemy’s retirement. None of these show any marks from 2 pounder fire but do bear many light automatic and Boyes rifle fire marks and were undoubtedly destroyed by B Sqn 11th Hussars in pursuit, which accounts for them not being reported, as the Sqn did not halt but pursued lorries for a considerable distance. These 3 were reported to me by Major Miller, but as I have stated, he was a little uncertain so I discounted his report. The 7th Hussars never went into this area at all so could not possibly have destroyed them.

In addition the 7th Hussars silenced and destroyed 4 field guns (14 pounders) and about 6 lorries of ammunition.

The number of lorries destroyed and captured also the number of prisoners are the same as originally reported and I am extremely doubtful, from all accounts, if more that 2 or 3 lorries got away and that the number of lorries in Lt Gape’s original wireless report when on patrol, was exaggerated.

About a week ago it was stated in the Egyptian Mail and Gazette that Lt Seymour Evans, 7th Hussars had been awarded the MC, for, though outnumbered, he had destroyed 12 light tanks and 4 guns. I was in sole charge of the battle of GIRBA and saw every detail, especially of the 7th Hussars tank action which I followed at a very short distance and therefore knew they destroyed the 9 tanks and 4 field guns enumerated above; but could not possibly have accounted for the other 3 as they were never in that area throughout the entire engagement.

I did see B Sqn 11th Hussars go, upon my orders, into the area where these 3 tanks were destroyed and were still lying derelict last week (they have since been evacuated).

I personally recommended Lt Seymour Evans for the MC and as Commander wrote the report of the action for Brigadier JAL Caunter Commander 4th Armd Bde. Thus it surprised me to see the above statement in the papers. No doubt the newspapers have made a mistake and I am not writing about Lt Seymour Evans very excellent award but for the sake of future records I am requesting that the above facts, especially the increased number of light tanks destroyed in the battle, should be officially recorded.

C Sqn were ordered to send out a patrol to the Salt Pans in case the enemy were moving South. Sgt Mines and his Tp were sent out but could see no sign and returned to Maddalena the following day. It is thought that the enemy turned round and went back to El Gubi and this was borne out by later events.

B Sqn patrols in the Capuzzo – Sidi AZEIZ area had nothing of interest to report.

RHQ were machine gunned by one large bomber at 0800 hrs. the gun was poking out of the bottom of the plane and fired straight down. Major Leetham came up from Cairo to see the CO and stayed to lunch. Returning to Rear Div and later back to Cairo.

A Sqn.
In observation of EL GUBI. No trace of the lost enemy column. It is presumed to have returned to EL GUBI. 2Lt JW Poston evacuated sick.

B Sqn.
Patrols observing the enemy in SIDI AZEIZ and CAPUZZO. NTR.Lt Hon GHC Loch went back to Cairo in charge of the leave party.

A Sqn.
In observation at EL GUBI. 2Tp (2Lt Spickernell) went to FORT MADDALENA assisted by a troop of A/Tk guns.

B Sqn.
Moved back to BUQ-BUQ to rest and reorganise.

RHQ.
Moved up to BIR SHEFERZEN. Some War Correspondents arrived and were taken to see FORT CAPUZZO. They were sent up to visit A Sqn in the evening.

A Sqn
In observation EL GUBI with a troop at FORT MADDALENA.

B Sqn
Returned from BUQ-BUQ and spent the night at DAR EL HAMRA with Rear HQ.

RHQ
Still at BIR SHEFERZEN. CO still sick. Capt Justice the MO went on leave and Capt Livingstone took his place. Major Miller arrived in the evening and stayed at RHQ.

A Sqn
Handed over the patrol to B Sqn at EL GUBI and returned to RHQ on the way to BUQ-BUQ.

B Sqn
Took over at EL GUBI. Capt C de B de Lisle was in command.

RHQ
At BIR SHEFERZEN. CO evacuated sick and Major AG Miller took command.

A Sqn
Continued journey to BUQ-BUQ to rest.

B Sqn
In observation at EL GUBI. No movements. Lt Hon GHC Loch returned from leave.

RHQ
Same position. War Correspondents arrived and went down to FORT MADDALENA.

A Sqn
Resting at BUQ-BUQ. 2Lt Spickernell went on leave.

B Sqn
At 0825 hrs 1Tp (Sgt Lucy) reported 20 vehicles moving towards him along the TRIGH EL ABD track. He was 5 miles West of TAIEB EL ESSEM at the time. His wireless would not work and as he only had 2 cars he decided to go to Sqn HQ with this news. Sqn HQ was 4 miles SE of TAIEB EL ESSEM. 4Tp (Sgt Hoyland) was immediately ordered to gain contact. Sqn HQ moved to 1 mile South of HAQFET EL BEDR. 5Tp was ordered to BIR DUADER to gain contact should the enemy go South.
3Tp (2Lt Halliday) was ordered to the “H” of TRIGH EL ABD as there was a possibility of the enemy having got past the Sqn along the track, during the period Sgt Lucy was reporting and out of contact with the enemy. The Tp at BIR SHEFERZEN, which had escorted B Echelon back to RHQ, was ordered to proceed West along the track.
At 1135 hrs 5Tp reported 6 lorries stationary at what he thought was BIR DLEUA. 4Tp was sent to join him and reported when he got there that he was 11 miles West of TAIEB EL ESSEM. This proved to be their correct position. 3Tp relieved 4Tp at 1245 hrs and 4Tp went to the South of EL GUBI to take up normal position of observation.
At 1250 hrs 5Tp, in observation of enemy lorries, reported intermittent rifle fire, not directed at them.
At 1651 hrs the two troops in observation of the enemy had an engagement with the enemy and reported they were fire on from moving lorries by arty. The guns were of 1.5 calibre and had a range of about 2,500 yards. The Troops had to withdraw but later the enemy withdrew towards EL GUBI. The Troops were then ordered to break contact and take up their normal positions. It is thought that the enemy force consisted of about 10 to 15 lorries and that it never actually reached TAIEB EL ESSEM, but turned around in their tracks before they got there.The Commanders reports of the day’s events showed that Sgt Hoyland and his Troop did very well during the day. It was unfortunate that Sgt Lucy could not get in touch by wireless and had to break contact in order to report. The column was then lost for some time and this carried a certain amount of uncertainty as to their position at RHQ.

RHQ
Same position. Major WI Leetham arrived to take over command. Major Miller went back to B Sqn. 2Lt Gape was evacuated sick. 2Lt Dier went on leave.

B Sqn
Reported no movement at EL GUBI.

A Sqn
left BUQ-BUQ.
B Sqn in observation of EL GUBI
RHQ no change.

A Sqn
1Tp (Sgt Hutchinson) was at FORT MADDALENA. 5Tp (Sgt Smith) in observation of SIDI AZEIZ from the West. 4Tp (TSM Clarke) SW o f SIDI OMAR remained in reserve with Sqn HQ.
At 0800 hrs Sgt Smith was shelled from SIDI AZEIZ, again at 2015hrs. certain amount of enemy movement in that area during the day.
B Sqn in observation of EL GUBI.
RHQ at BIR SHEFERZEN.

A Sqn
Two Troops (2Lt Henderson and Sgt Smith) watching SIDI AZEIZ. TSM Woodward’s Tp went out at night to try and find the AZEIZ – BARDIA pipeline. Could not find it.

B Sqn
1Tp (Sgt Bowyer) in observation South of EL GUBI. 5Tp (Sgt Hoyland) patrolled 3 miles NW and SW of TAIEB EL ESSEM. No incidents. Sqn HQ was at a point 5 miles South of Kilo 27 which is 4 miles East of TAIEB EL ESSEM.
RHQ. No change.

A Sqn
TSM Woodward returned at 0430 hrs, nil report. TSM Clarke and 2Lt Spickernell’s Troops in observation of SIDI AZEIZ. Sgt Smith and RE party left on road mining mission at 1930 hrs. owing to heavy A/Tk and MG fire the objective was not reached. Fire appeared to come from SIDI AZEIZ and also SIDI AZEIZ – BARDIA road. The Tp was recalled at 2224 hrs.

B Sqn.
5Tp (Sgt Hoyland) in observation of GUBI – GIARRABUB road. 2Tp (2Lt Halliday MC) patrolled 3 miles NW and SW of TAIED EL ESSEM. 1Tp (Sgt Bowyer MM) carried out recce to EL GUBI and drew fire.

RHQ. No change.

B Sqn
4Tp (Lt Loch) and 3Tp (2Lt Halliday MC) watching GUBI, South and West, NTR.

B Sqn
4Tp (Lt Loch) and 1Tp (Sgt Bowyer MM) in observation South and East of EL GUBI. Capt de Lisle carried out recce to BIR SCIUFSUIF and CHLETA, NTR.

A Sqn.
Patrol watching SIDI AZEIZ. Enemy lorries reported in SIDI AZEIZ area. 1Tp (Sgt Hutchinson) left on recce of area North of EL GUBI over which C Sqn were to carry out a raid in the future. Increased enemy air activity.

B Sqn
1Tp (Sgt Bowyer MM) and 5Tp (Sgt Hoyland) watching EL GUBI from South and East, NTR. Sqn HQ moved to a point 5 miles due North of Kilo 27 on the TRIGH EL ABD.

A Sqn
NTR from SIDI AZEIZ patrols. One enemy bomber engaged at 1045 hrs by SA fire from Sqn HQ.
2Lt Spickernell in observation West of SIDI OMAR. He reported in the evening 1 MARC and 1 RRAC going across his front at high speed. As none of our own troops were known to be in the area, this caused a certain amount of consternation as it was thought they might be some of our own vehicles which had been captured being used by the enemy. However they turned out to be some War Correspondents who had been visiting the scene of the GIRBA battle.

B Sqn
5Tp (Sgt Hoyland) and 3Tp (2Lt Halliday) in observation EL GUBI from South and East. No incidents.

A Sqn
Sqn role was taken over by 7th Hussars. Sqn moved out at 1530 to take over B Sqn role. Arrived 1 mile NW of TAIEB EL ESSEM at 2020 hrs and camped for the night.B SqnOrders were given to lay ambushes on the EL GUBI – EL ADEM and EL GUBI – BIR HACHEIM roads. 3Tp and 4Tp (2Lt Halliday and Lt Loch) went to a point 10 miles North of EL GUBI on the EL ADEM track. No enemy were seen all night and they retired at 0700 hrs.
1Tp and 5Tp (Sgt Bowyer and 2Lt Dier) went to a point 12 miles West of EL GUBI on the BIR HACHEIM track. No enemy seen and at about 0800 hrs they retired to the WADI ES GERABIU about 10 miles SSW of EL GUBI where tracks of vehicles had previously been seen.
The Sqn concentrated at BIR SHEFERZEN at 1330. It then went on to BUQ-BUQ staying the night at BIR HABATA.

RHQ
Left at 1730 hrs to a position on the Sidi Azeiz – Gabr Salah track. Rear HQ at Dar el Hamra were heavily bombed and machine gunned by 9 planes at 1730 hrs, very lucky to have no casualties.

A Sqn
2Lt Spickernell and TSM Clarke’s Troops in observation of EL GUBI. Major Blakiston Houston and Lt Turnbull made a recce towards EL GUBI and got within 3½ miles of objective, visibility poor, NTR. Sqn HQ moved to a position 5 miles East of TAIEB EL ESSEM. 18 fighters passed over 2Lt Spickernell at 1735 hrs. reported to RHQ and Bde. Our own fighters went up and gained contact over SOLLUM and shot down 4 enemy machines with the loss of one to themselves.

B Sqn continued their journey to BUQ-BUQ.Capt Wainman went on leave.

RHQ at Bir Sheferzen.

0600 - Lt Pitman, LCpl Dayman and Sgt Mines proceeded to a point South of TRIGH CAPUZZO at HAQFET ESC SCIOMAR. Lt Pitman MC and LCpl Dayman were taken on Sgt Mines’s MARC to HAQFET ESC SCIOMAR on the TRIGH CAPUZZO where they dismounted and proceeded on foot North for 3 miles to remain in observation of the TOBRUK – BARDIA road. The time was between 0430 and 0500 hrs. Sgt Mines then returned to his Tp and his orders were to recce further West along the escarpment in the middle of the day when it was thought that enemy aircraft would not be up.

1245 - Mines reported he was in difficulties as he was being attacked by 9 fighters. His position was just South of the WADI ESC SCIOMAR. He was ordered to move South but replied that his MARC was out of action. At 1314 hrs he reported that the aircraft had gone but he could see vehicles approaching from the West. (1317 hrs Cpl Peacock’s Tp withdrawn from SIDI AZEIZ to Sqn HQ).

1323 - Sgt Mines reported that the aircraft had returned but the vehicles had disappeared to the West. He could not see what they were. 3Tp, Sgt Whitehouse, was ordered at 1250 hrs to reinforce Sgt Mines. He left Sqn HQ at 1304 and Mines was informed. At 1327 hrs Sgt Mines’s Tp reported that Sgt Mines was over at the other car attending to the wounded and that Tpr Nightingale was hit in the back, Tpr Gay in the leg and Cpl Grayston in the arm.

1346 - Sgt Mines himself reported that 2 and possibly 3 of his cars were out of action and that he was trying to get the MAC going and at 1347 hrs it was reported that 2 RRAC were on fire caused by incendiary bombs. At 1348 hrs Mines was told to evacuate his car and make off South and Sgt Whitehouse would pick him up and his car if and when he arrived.

1417 - Sgt Whitehouse arrived in the area BIR HALEISIN and reported 1 enemy fighter overhead which circled twice and flew away.

1453 – Sgt Mines MAC reported as still immobile.

1503 – Sgts Mines and Whitehouse informed that air assistance had been asked for.

1515 – Sgt Mines reported he was going to try and move his car.

1516 – Sgt Whitehouse’s MAC broke a King pin.

1522 – Sgt Whitehouse reported 2 enemy tanks advancing from the North.

1523 – Mines reported his MAC moving.

1527 – 2 enemy aircraft over Whitehouse and Mines reported enemy aircraft dropping incendiary bombs.

1532 – Mines reported bombs falling all round and asked if he could evacuate the car and destroyed the wireless set.

1533 – Sgt Whitehouse reported he was heavily attacked by fighters and LCpl Parker (the fitter in the 3-ton fitters lorry) was hit in the head.

1534 – Whitehouse reported being attacked by heavy tanks.

1535 – Mines was asked about his rendezvous with Lt Pitman and replied that he had one that night at the place where he dropped him but if he was not there, then at the same time (between 2300 and 0200) and place the next night.

1545 – Whitehouse reported LCpl Brown wounded in the shoulder.

1604 – Whitehouse reported one MAC and one RRAC out of action and one RRAC (2Lt Jenson) missing.

1606 – Fitters lorry reported abandoned and Lcpl Parker and Tpr Staples (driver) on RRAC of Sgt Whitehouse.

1607 – No reply from Sgt Mines.

1611 – Whitehouse said that he had seen Mines MAC coming towards them but aircraft had then attacked and they could only see smoke now.

1612 – Operator on Mines MAC said they were being attacked by aircraft again and asked Sqn HQ to call as little as possible as he thought the aircraft would hear them.

1620 – Sqn HQ moved to BIR HALEISIN with Cpl Peacock’s Tp.

1627 – Whitehouse was asked if he could see tanks. He replied he could see two vehicles one of which might be the fitters lorry.

1628 – Whitehouse reported one RRAC mobile but push rod on the MAC badly bent.

1629 – LCpl Martin the operator on Sgt Whitehouse’s car had got on to the RRAC and gone to try and investigate the two vehicles on the horizon.

1649 – LCpl Martin reported position where Mines had been heavily bombed.

1722 – LCpl Martin reported MAC moving slowly along and being heavily bombed. The push rod broke soon afterwards.

1730 – Bombers reported gone but no movement seen from RRAC.

1745 – Tpr Buckett came over from the RRAC and reported Sgt Whitehouse was killed. At this point enemy aircraft appeared to have ceased operations.

The two Troops in action had been almost continually bombed and machine gunned for 5 hours. 9 fighter were in the air at one time. When Sgt Whitehouse went in the RRAC to investigate some vehicles on the horizon, the car was heavily bombed and rendered immobile. Whitehouse and Buckett got underneath the car. Whitehouse was hit in the stomach and died at once. Buckett tried to get back to the other car but was machine gunned as was forced to crawl ¼ of a mile on his stomach. He got back and reported Sgt Whitehouse’s death.

The other car of the Tp (2Lt Jenson) was last seen at about 1645 hrs when it went up to Sgt Mines’s MAC, take some men off it and disappear moving West with about 10 men on the car. Some other vehicles, presumably enemy, were seen with him. The fitters lorry which had been sent up with Sgt Whitehouse was also thought to have been taken away by the enemy, at 1805 hrs 4Tp (Cpl Peacock) was sent up to collect survivors from Sgt Whitehouse’s Tp, the RRAC and kit off the MAC. Sgt Whitehouse’s body was also brought back.

Cpl Peacock’s Tp was sent out later to keep the rendezvous with Lt Pitman. They reached the objective at 0100 hrs and remained until 0400 hrs. no sign of Lt Pitman or any of Sgt Mines Tp.

A Sqn
Sqn in the same position with 2 patrols watching EL GUBI. The MO was on a visit to the Sqn but he was required by C Sqn and he left with TSM Clarke’s Tp as escort at 1830 hrs. they went to Pt. 197 on the SIDI AZEIZ - GABR SALAH track and the wounded were evacuated back to the MO there.B Sqn at BUQ-BUQ.

RHQ
moved to a position on the Sidi Azeiz – Gabr Salah track.

The whole Sqn withdrew to RHQ at Pt. 197. RHQ then withdrew to BIR SHEFERZEN arriving there at about 1600 hrs. 1 MAC and 1 RRAC of Cpl Peacock’s Tp and a 8cwt Bug from RHQ were sent out at 2130 hrs to attempt to pick up Lt Pitman and LCpl Dayman. They reached the rendezvous at about 0100 with the RRAC and the Bug, the MAC having been left further back. No sign of Lt Pitman, although Cpl Peacock patrolled 2 miles East and 1 mile West of the rendezvous. They remained until 0320 hrs and then started back. Just after they left the TRIGH CAPUZZO going South, they were fired at by A/Tk guns. The Bug disappeared and although Cpl Peacock waited it did not reappear and he went back without it, picking up the MARC on the way.

A Sqn
Usual patrol watching EL GUBI. 2Lt Spickernell Tp left at 1845 hrs to try and intercept traffic on the EL GUBI – EL ADEM road. Returned at 0730, NTR.

A Sqn
TSM Clarke’s Tp carried out a close recce of EL GUBI the previous night and in the early morning he reported at least 50 vehicles and some gun emplacements clearly visible. 3Tp (2Lt Henderson) carried out a close recce of EL GUBI during the night and early morning. Got within 1½ miles of EL GUBI and reported camp fires on the ridge around the camp.

At 1900 hrs the Sqn moved out again to carry out a recce for Lt Pitman. It was carried out be 3 patrols of 1 AC and 1 B vehicle each parallel and to the West of SIDI AZEIZ – GABR SALAH track and NW to GABBANET EL MGAIER. Nothing was seen except two white verey lights.
A Sqn patrols in observation of El Gubi. Capt Lloyd arrived as 2i/c.
B Sqn resting at BUQ-BUQ.

A Sqn
At about 2100 hrs 30 enemy lorries reported moving East from EL GUBI. 2Lt Spickernell’s Tp in contact. They came about 9 miles East along TRIGH EL ABD with their lights on, halted, then returned to the GUBI area. W/T communication was very bad during the night.

Herewith please find information and general report on the air attack imposed on Troops of C Squadron 11th Hussars .

It is regretted that very little information is at present available, as personnel involved (except for one Troop who are at present on a 72 hour patrol) are either dead or missing.

The following information is available however, and is submitted to you for perusal and information.

1. A reconnaissance biplane always appears to locate the Armoured Cars first, and after machine gunning and bombing the Troop, flies away. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, the fighters appear and engage the target.
2. Tactics of the fighters in nearly all cases, were dive bombing and machine gunning from out of the sun in single file. Then the planes would fly around and break up and repeat the attack from all angles on all cars. The planes fly at low altitude.
3. Both 2 seater, single engined biplanes and single seater, single engined monoplanes were in action. (17 monoplanes and 8 biplanes)
4. Great use of incendiary bombs and possibly bullets were used with good results, also armour piercing bullets. Two RRAC and one MRAC tyre were set on fire. In another instance a ring of incendiary bombs were dropped around a RRAC, making visibility practically nil.

A Sqn
The Tp in contact with the enemy reported that the enemy force which had come out the previous night was now 9 miles West of TAIEB EL ESSEM facing towards EL GUBI. The Tp were ordered to break contact. Sqn HQ returned to BIR GIBWI leaving one Tp in observation of TAIEB EL ESSEM. The Sqn handed over to B Sqn during the evening and returned to BIR SHEFERZEN.

B Sqn
Sqn left BUQ-BUQ and arrived at BIR SHEFERZEN at 1600 hrs and moved up to take over from A Sqn in the evening. 1Tp (Sgt Bowyer) went on to take up a position near TAIEB EL ESSEM. Sqn HQ were at BIR GIBWI. 3Tp (Sgt Rich) took over from TSM Woodward at FORT MADDALENA.

A Sqn
Went on to BUQ-BUQ.

B Sqn
HQ in BIR GIBWI area with a patrol forward at TAIEB EL ESSEM. Sgt Rich Tp at FORT MADDALENA.RHQ at BIR SHEFERZEN.

(Sgd) Brigadier,
Support Group.

C Sqn.
Visibility was very bad during the early morning. At about 0900 hrs a column of 200 vehicles were reported stationary 1½ miles NE of the Northern camp. The camp appeared to be deserted and there were only 6 lorries in the Southern camp. Our patrols were driven off by A/Tk and shellfire.
At 0941 hrs, the Echelon and LAD were bombed and machine gunned at BIR SHEFERZEN. 100 anti-personnel and incendiary bombs were dropped but no casualties.
At 1030 hrs 34 vehicles were reported stationary 2 miles West of GABR SREDI. By 1130 hrs these had increased to 113 vehicles and were drawn up in a long column facing East. Later more vehicles joined the column from the West and at 1218 hrs the whole column moved NE.
By 1250 hrs the head of the column was at point 189 (462369) moving NE. at 1500 hrs, the head halted at Pt. 197 (47053755). They moved on slowly during the afternoon and spent the night in the vicinity of Pt. 207.
At 1745 hrs the patrol watching the head was attacked by aircraft.
At 1755 hrs a column of 250 vehicles containing 1000 Infantry with tanks was reported near BIR UAAR.

C Sqn.
In observation of enemy forces in same area.

The position of the Regt was as follows:-
   B Sqn in North watching eastern exits from BARRANI.
   A Sqn in the middle observing to the West.
   C Sqn on the South as far as the 300 grid line.
The Support Group were withdrawing through the Regt to their new line during most of the night. They were not all clear by the following morning and some of the 60th and Rifle Brigade were still out on the southern flank. There had been much air activity during the day and many bombing attacks carried out by the enemy.

A Sqn
HQ at the East of ALAM EL QATRANI with patrols out to the West.

B Sqn
HQ at 637352 with patrols watching the eastern exits of BARRANI. Very little happened as on the previous day, but small parties of enemy lorries with tanks proceeded about as far as the 626 Grid line on the main road, also to the South and SE of BARRANI. One patrol was fired on by A/Tk guns from the backs of lorries.
Enemy air activity was again slight. The RASC produced some rations and water for the Regt. The weather was noticeably cooler and much more pleasant. Major Miller from B Sqn visited RHQ in the evening.

A patrol of A Sqn saw some lorries carrying mules. The mules were taken off the lorries and allowed to graze for a time. During the afternoon a report came in from Div to say that two columns of 10 and 15 ACs had crossed the frontier at FORT MADDALENA. C Sqn were ordered to keep a look out for them.

During the day C Sqn salvaged the RAF lorry which had been abandoned at BIR KHAMSA. News was received that the men of C Sqn who had been missing since July 26th were prisoners and were safe and well. About 3 had been wounded but were getting on well. The one exception was Sgt Mines who had died of wounds in TOBRUK hospital on August 3rd. Lt TI Pitman MC was said to be safe and well treated. Air activity again was slight.

C Sqn sent a patrol to locate an enemy force reported by Air to be in the area Xtracks South of the White Pillars. 50 enemy vehicles were reported by the patrol to be in that area. They saw the patrol and released what appeared to be carrier pigeons. Some of the lorries moved towards the patrol (Sgt Peacock) and he withdrew. Two lorries were also seen in a Wadi close by unloading crates. They were chased by the patrol but made off West and escaped. One patrol reported 35 enemy vehicles moving NW towards NIZWET HABS at 1025 hrs. they later halted in area 603360.

A Sqn.

In observation in the same line. NTR.

B Sqn.
Seven enemy vehicles came down the main road as far as the 608 Grid and then returned to BARRANI. At 1500 hrs the whole of C Column advanced to the gun positions chosen at 607365 arriving there at 1800 hours. Two Troops of B Sqn were placed on either flank of the gun position to give early warning of any outflanking movement by the enemy. Our guns opened fire on the camp at 1900 hours and continued for 30 minutes. The enemy also replied with shellfire. The patrol on the North flank reported enemy lorries and guns at 607369. These guns were firing at our own gun position. At 2000 hours C column withdrew in the dark. Some damage was done to vehicles on the return journey owing to the bad going. It was estimated that 3 enemy lorries had been set on fire by our shelling.

A Sqn.
On the same line of observation.

B Sqn.
The day was spent reorganising and maintaining the vehicles after the previous evening operation. The enemy shelled various places to his East and South during the day, otherwise there was no movement. C Column was relieved by G Column commanded by Major Grenville Grey KRRC.

A Sqn.
On same line of observation with Sqn HQ near ALAM SHITEWAN.

B Sqn.
A certain amount of enemy movement between ALAM TUMMAR and BARRANI was observed and in the afternoon enemy patrols were seen in areas 606372 and 606379. The former appeared to be establishing a dump and the latter consisted of 8 lorries and 4 guns. Sqn HQ moved to 628361. At 1500 hours Major Miller and Major Grenville Grey made a recce to the BIR MATROD area.

C Sqn.
Moved to BIR HASHIM 637350.

B Sqn.
Same position under command of G Column Comdr.

A Sqn.
Same line of observation with Sqn HQ at same place. No enemy movement.
The CO had received a letter from Lt TI Pitman MC which gave news of the C Sqn men captured on the 26th July.

C Sqn.
At BIR HASHIM 637350.

A Sqn.
HQ at ALAM SHITEWAN with patrols out on the line from the Xtracks at 612355 to ALAM DABASH.

B Sqn.
HQ at 627362 with patrols from the coast to A Sqn’s northern boundary.
RHQ at ALAM EL GIBARAT 643345.
The enemy’s biggest concentrations were in the ALAM EL TUMMAR area where there were between 250 and 300 vehicles and in the BIR SOFAFI area where there were about 400 vehicles. There was a little enemy movement of lorries and guns in the NIZWET HABS area but otherwise no forward movement.

29.9.40          JFB Combe. Lt Col.

Sept 16th, 1940
     The Coldstream Guards were holding a position along the 584 Grid line supported by a French Motor Coy and 12 guns of 3rd RHA. At 0740 hours, 5Tp (2Lt Dier) reported head of column at 570371. They later reported 25 light tanks at 570369 moving SE. They were then shelled and had to move from ALAM EL RIMF. At 0930 hours 2Tp (Sgt Hoyland) reported 70 vehicles at 570370 and 3 medium tanks at 577362. At about 1100 hours the Guards withdrew to a position at ALAM EL DABDE. At about this time 2Lt Dier captured two enemy motor cyclists, one of whom was wounded. At 1130 hours a column of 60 tanks and lorries began to move East from WESHKER. 2Lt Dier kept in touch. At 1300 hours enemy columns reached SIDI BARRANI – BIR KHAMSA track at 596371. They then turned North. The column was shelled by our guns. Information had been received from Support Group that a Sqn of out tanks was advancing North along the BIR KHAMSA – SIDI BARRANI track and were only 7½ miles from SIDI BARRANI.
     Consequently the Coldstream guards did not withdraw at once but as the tanks never turned up they eventually had to, and only just got away in time. Just before dust 3Tp (2Lt Halliday) captured a motor cyclist who fell off his M/C and whistled for the patrol to come and pick him up. The Coldstream Guards had retired to a position South of MAATEN MOHAMMED and the Sqn were watching the eastern exits from SIDI BARRANI.

Sept 17th, 1940
     At 0740 hours 3Tp (2Lt Halliday) reported 24 vehicles just out of BARRANI and at 0940 hours 3 lorries at 606372. At 0945 hours 1Tp (Sgt Taber MM) reported 6 vehicles going along the main SIDI BARRANI – MATRUH road. This column was later reported to consist of 10 lorries and some M/Cs. They reached the 621 Grid line at 1230 hours and halted. At 1300 hours 3 of the lorries and some M/Cs continued on to the 626 Grid line where they were fired on. One M/C blew up and the whole patrol retired to SIDI BARRANI at 1600 hours. Touch was regained with the enemy at SIDI BARRANI at 1600 hours and the eastern exits from the latter place kept under observation. During the night the Guards retired from the position at MAATEN MOHAMMED and went back to MATRUH. During the last few days the Sqn had often been under shellfire and had been fortunate in escaping any damage or casualties.

From:- No. 319529
L/Cpl Garner,
11th Hussars PAO.
English Prisoner of War,
Cyrenaica
Officer Commanding
11th Hussars PAO
Egypt.

Sir,
     The officer in charge of British Prisoners here has asked me to write to you on behalf of the family of one GAGGIO MONTANO.
     This Italian soldier has been reported missing and is believed to be a Prisoner of War in Egypt. He was among the men captured with General LASTRUCCI.
     At present the family of this man have received no word concerning him and would be obliged if you would place this letter in the proper quarter in order that he may write to his people.
     At present I am the only prisoner here who can write, the other two still being wounded. Tomorrow I shall be going to the rest of my Troop at a concentration camp.
     You will be pleased to hear that we are very well treated. The doctors are very good and done everything possible for our wounded, especially for Sgt Mines who eventually died. Sgt Mines was given a Military Funeral with full honours.
I am, sir,
Yours obediently
(Sgd) PH Garner, L/Cpl.

T. I. Pitman.
Dear Colonel,
     I am afraid I made a bit of a box up over this show. We tried to walk home, but we were really half cocked before we started. Then we ran out of water. I would like to tell you that Cpl Dayman put up a grand show and walked in his socks for several miles with his feet red raw, until he could go no further. I put him in a well to keep cool – then I thought I saw our troops but the mirage was very bad and I walked straight into the enemy. They went and got Dayman and did everything they could for us, water above all! Dayman is still covered in bandages but he it quite ok again.
     Do tell Peter not to worry, as I am sure he is. He did everything he could, but it was just the luck of the draw. I have no one to blame but myself. God, I wish I could have the last week over again.
     A plane flew over us the morning of the first day’s walking but we could not attract its attention. We often shot at it, but it still went on. It nearly broke my heart (one of Van’s boys too). But perhaps Allah was good to us as we were in a pretty bad state when we were picked up.
     I am hoping to see Mines and Gay whom I am afraid are pretty bad. Mines has lost a leg and he also has one above the heart. Gay has lost a leg and Tpr Garner an arm. The others are ok but I have seen none of them as yet. They are all getting the best of attention with a good doctor. I will let you know if I see them.
     I hope this reaches you ok and do tell Peter how sorry I am about all this. Everyone is most kind here but the outlook is depressing as I miss you all very much.

     Best of luck to all PAO’s always,
          Yours ever,
               (sgd) Tommy.

PS I have just seen Mines. I am afraid he is bad. The doctor says he has a 50/50 chance. The other two, Garner looks bad but they say he is ok, Gay looks as good as ever.

Note:- Sgt Mines died afterwards on August 3rd and was buried with full Military Honours.

In the Field
21 September 1940.

SUPPORT GROUP – 7th ARMOURED DIVISION
Special Order of the Day
By
Brigadier WHE Gott MC

     The Commander in Chief Middle East in a visit to the forward area yesterday, asked the Commander Support Group to convey to all ranks his congratulations on the good work carried out by the Support Group during the operations of the past week.
     During his visit he also stated that the impending battle in which we shall be engaged, was regarded as likely to be decisive in the present campaign for the mastery of the Mediterranean.
     The Commander Support Group conveys to all ranks who served under his command during the recent operations his thanks and appreciation for their determined efforts and for the cheerful spirit in which they met difficult and arduous conditions.
     Our own losses in men and material were small, whist by our action the enemy cannot have lost less than 150 vehicles and large numbers of personnel. This is a substantial success. Our immediate task now is to ensure that we are fit and ready to play our part in the final overthrow of the invader.

In the Field
20/9/40

7th Armoured Division Intelligence summary No. 49
(based on information up to 2000 hours 11 Sep 40)

1. GENER