A Sqn.
Sqn still with RHQ at Y3147. L/Sgt Hall returned with his Tp arriving at 1630 hours.

B Sqn.
Sqn came under orders of 8th Armd Bde and moved to Y4847 to be closer to them. Remained in that position for the night.

A Sqn.
Sqn moved with RHQ at 1200 hours to area of MISURATA arriving at 1750 hours where the night was spent.

A Sqn.
Sqn moved at first light and by 1000 hours was in the area X7540. From there 1Tp Sgt Trumper moved to X6828 and 5Tp Sgt Longmate Tp X6038. Both Tps reported no movement seen and 5Tp returned to SHQ at last light.
1Tp reported the going West from BIR SITRA area as being virtually impassable.

B Sqn.
We had to take over from the Royals. At 1100 hours the Sqn moved to X5958. 1Tp, 2Tp and 3Tp went out to the Royals positions but did not take over until the next day.

4Tp got observation of BUNGEM and 5Tp was sent to contact A Sqn, then to a position at X5118.
At 1300 hours the two SHQ ACs plus 3Tp and the Jeeps set out for a local recce of BUNGEM and 3Tp got within 1 mile of it and SHQ plus 4Tp and the Jeeps moved across the road about 3 miles to the North.
At 1500 hours 3Tp reported 2 men on the escarpment to the West of BUNGEM and 3 MET stationary in the area. 3Tp remained in observation and SHQ and 4Tp and the jeeps moved into the broken country to the West of the track with the object of getting behind the enemy.
After going West for about 4 miles SHQ and 4Tp and jeeps turned South and saw 6 men running from a high point into a wadi. They were chased by SHQ who suddenly came under fire from Bredas. SHQ and 4Tp then went hull-down on a ridge on the other side and saw 3 enemy ACs, one 8 wheeler, and 2 trucks with A/Tk guns. A duel at about 1000 yards ensued and eventually the enemy called it a day and made off, being chased by us for about 3 miles without catching them.
Tpr Dunthorne was hit in the foot by a 20mm which pierced the AC, but he was only bruised.
SHQ remained in the same area till last light. 5Tp went out to relieve 3Tp near BUNGEM, 4Tp had another big end.

A Sqn.
At first light 2Tp Sgt Hall relieved 1Tp after they had jointly recced the ground in area BIR SITRA. By 1000 hours 2Tp was in visual touch with C Sqn patrol in area X5618.
4Tp Capt Wingfield Digby moved West to the eastern edge of Wadi EL CHERBIR in order to watch the track running in the bottom. All Tps reported no movement seen.

B Sqn.
Took over from the Royals. There were three patrols out. We had a troop of 25pdrs and 3 A/Tk guns from the 3rd RHA under our command.

A Sqn.
At first light 5Tp took over from 2Tp and 2Tp moved to join 4Tp.
The Colonel visited SHQ at 0935 hours and then went on to visit C Sqn.
At 1430 hours SHQ moved to X6430 and during the time of the move 4Tp and 2Tp were recceing forward towards the GHEDDAHIA BUNGEM track in area X4237. On reaching area X4537 they had a mechanical breakdown and were forced to return. Previously they had seen a Jeep moving East. The Colonel on returning from C Sqn tracked this vehicle eastwards and it eventually proved to be one of the LRDG containing 7 men and was one of a patrol of Capt Hore Ruthuen who, his Sgt reported, was killed while attacking an enemy night leaguer in the MISURATA area.
Advance SHQ moved to X5838 and met the Colonel who later returned to RHQ. At last light they returned to SHQ.

B Sqn.
Jan 5th – 13th.
We remained on this line with three patrols out and there was a certain amount of enemy movement going on in front of us the whole time. During the period we had two Tps from D Bty 3rd RHA under command each for 2 days, and then we had two Tps from N Bty RHA. Each night two Tps remained out.
On the 6th we had to withdraw East for about 7 miles owing to the threat on our North caused by 3 tanks and some MET. The Tp of D Bty commanded by Capt Barrington got a very good shoot on the tanks, which rushed off home as fast as they could.
On the 10th we had got so low in cars owing to having to send the bad oilers back, that 3Tp was broken up, his only remaining car going to 2Tp and Sgt White went back to take over the Jeep Tp.

A Sqn.
At first light 1Tp and 5Tp recced forward as far as X4039 and reported the going as good. They then remained just East of the BUNGEM track in the hope of ambushing enemy AC patrols. None we forthcoming and at 1400 hours they returned.
LCpl Mitchell spent the morning repairing 4Tp’s car in the wadi at X5638. By midday this job was done and 4Tp and 2Tp rejoined SHQ.
By 1200 hours C Sqn had taken over our patrols and the Sqn was concentrated for the night at X6340.

C Sqn.
7th – 12th Jan.
After breakfast the Sqn moved to join RHQ in the wadi at X7251 and remained there until January 13th, well camouflaged in the trees. Water was available in some quantity from the well close to PILASTRINO and all were able to bathe and wash clothing. A necessity, as some men have had lice in the last fortnight.
Tpr Crosby was wounded by 109’s ground strafing, he was firing his rifle at them and was unluckily hit.
On Jan 12th Major Lawson and the Colonel visited KDG’s HQ as A Sqn were to take over that part of the line tomorrow. Major Lawson went on to visit Major Llewellyn Palmer in the area X6167 and see the patrol positions from there.

A Sqn.
The ADVANCE TO TRIPOLI.
Major Lawson MC, Capt Petch DCM 2i/c,1Tp Sgt Trumper, 2Tp Sgt Hall, 4Tp Capt Wingfield Digby, 5Tp Sgt Green, Jeep Tp Sgt Martin.
Major Lawson visited Tp positions at first light and while he was away SHQ was machine gunned by 109’s. as usual the Sqn Ldr's car was the centre of the enemy’s attraction.
Sqn was replenished at midday and carried 10 days water and rations.
At 1445 hours 4Tp and 1Tp left to take over from 2Tp and 5Tp.
At 1600 hours Sqn moved to area X5565. Tps on patrol were intermittently shelled during the day.
During the first hours of darkness, 8th Armd Bde moved into Battle position in area X4464. Plan as follows:-
8th Armd Bde to take TRIPOLI proceeding by the desert route, 11th Hussars were AC Regt to 8th Armd Bde, 4th Light Armd Bde and New Zealand Div, with the Greys attached to cover southern flank of 8th Armd Bde.
51st Highland Div to advance by way of the road, they had 23 Armd Bde attached. 22nd Armd Bde to form Army reserve and cover western flank of 51st H Div.By 2330 hours all troops were in battle position.

B Sqn.
At about 0900 hours A Sqn of the Royals under Major Hamilton Russell came and took over from us. For the rest of the day until 1800 hours the Sqn remained in the usual leaguer getting ready for the advance which was starting the next morning.
Our role in the advance was to act as advance guard to the 8th Armd Bde across the BUNGEM road right up to the ZEMZEM. The Sqn was going to advance on a three Tp front with SHQ travelling with Colonel Pyman and 3rd RTR.
At 1700 hours the three Tps went out to the positions from which they were starting the next day. 2Tp Capt Lockett went to X4457, 5Tp Lt Copeland to X4365 and 4Tp Sgt Smith to X4470. SHQ moved to X4465 where we met Col Pyman and leaguered for the night with three Tps out.

A Sqn.
At first light 4Tp and 1Tp started to move West with 8th Armd Bde. Enemy held strong positions to the East of Wadi ZEMZEM which they had been preparing for several weeks.
1Tp progress was impeded and he crossed and re-crossed the GHEDDAHIA – BUNGEM track on several occasions during the day. He was responsible for any information of enemy movements South in the track area and this he successfully did. By 1400 hours 131 Bde were in his area and had formed an A/Tk screen astride the track facing North in area of UMM EL RAML.
Two miles after crossing the BUNGEM track 4Tp’s advance was also stopped by heavy enemy shellfire from the West and also from 75mm guns firing from a wadi to his NW.
SHQ less Adv SHQ, had remained 2 miles to the East of the BUNGEM track, Adv SHQ remained in the area of 4Tp throughout the day and also were subjected to heavy shellfire on some occasions. The day developed into an artillery battle and also into tank battles on the whole 8th Armd Bde front.
In the South the 4th Light Armd Bde made some progress while in the North Highland Div were attacking according to plan.
By the middle of the afternoon the situation on the northern 8th Armd Bde front had not changed. Enemy tanks had moved South to cover a threat movement by Sherwood Rangers and 3rd RTR. Staffordshire Yeomanry were moved to support. A tank battle started which continued until last light, fought at mostly extreme range. It resulted in 14 enemy tanks being accounted for. We lost fewer in the battle but during the morning had lost several Cruisers from the Staffs and Sherwood Rangers probing at enemy A/Tk guns, mostly of the 88mm type.
Our 4.5 guns had been firing effectively at enemy positions East of ZEMZEM since midday.
At last light the usual ‘brew-ups’ were blazing. 1Tp was ordered to move South and join 4Tp, and SHQ moved to join Adv SHQ one mile West of the BUNGEM track in area X4066. It was considered that the enemy had had fairly rough treatment during the day, and that in all probability would retire during the night. At 2200 hours 4Tp reported heavy vehicle movement to his West, this continued until 0230 hrd and was fading into the distance. The enemy had apparently fought another strong rear guard position and were now withdrawing.

B Sqn.
At 0715 hours the three out Tps started moving across the BUNGEM road. After going about 2 miles due West from the road all three Tps came under heavy shellfire from the high ground to the West. The leading Armd Regt also came under heavy fire and everyone was held up.
For the rest of the day, the enemy held us with his guns and the Armd Bde deployed and endeavoured to push him out. All three Tps had a very unpleasant day, being under continual shellfire. 2Tp on the left managed to push on another 2 miles, but then got driven back. 5Tp in the centre could not get on at all, neither could 4Tp on the left. The situation remained the same all day.
We leaguered with RHQ at X4065. The three Tps remained out.

A Sqn.
At first light 4Tp and 1Tp were replenished and continued to move West while 2Tp moved North of 1Tp.
By 0900 hours these three Tps had reached the line of the Wadi ZEMZEM without meeting any opposition. B Sqn were recceing westwards to our South with the Bde axis of advance the X65 North/South Grid after Wadi ZEMZEM a bearing direct to SEDDADA.
SHQ moved West in close proximity to advance troops. A dummy minefield was encountered on the western slopes of Wadi ZEMZEM, but this was quickly proved by the RE’s attached to the Sqn and the advance continued.
In broken country in area X1682, 4Tp was engaged by an enemy AC patrol who appeared to be working on a very wide and lately used track running NW. this later proved to be the track made by the enemy withdrawing during the night towards SEDDADA. 2Tp had been working close to 4Tp and went to their assistance. 1Tp who had been withdrawn from the right flank was ordered to attempt to outflank the enemy to the West. The enemy withdrew without close contact being made and fought rear guard delaying actions with 1Tp and 4Tp and also 2Tp, along the line of the enemy withdrawal as far to the NW as the SEDDADA – GHEDDANIA track.
This enemy delaying party consisted of at least 3 ACs and 2 A/Tk guns in lorries, but they never allowed our Tps to get within advantageous range.
By 1300 hours the line of the track was reached and by 1320 hours forward elements of 8th Armd Bde were also on that line. 4Tp had a great chase after 2 enemy vehicles moving to SEDDADA and was unlucky not to capture them.
At 1400 hours 1Tp captured two 15cwt trucks with 2 20mm guns and 1 officer and 20 ORs (German).
The enemy by now were fighting a rear guard action 2 miles SE of SEDDADA, and troops came under A/Tk and artillery shellfire. Sqn had the task of protection of 8th Bde left flank, with special attention to GHEDDAHIA track. It was also hoped to make contact with 12th Royal Lancers who were AC Regt to 23 Bde.
By 1500 hours the Sherwood Rangers were fairly heavily engaged with enemy tank forces SW of SEDDADA to whom they did considerable damage, although full advantage was not made of their success, for Infantry failed to clear up advantages made by the tanks, and withdrew at last light allowing the enemy to return and remove equipment that at 1600 hours had been in our hands.
The enemy held up 8th Armd Bde from 1600 hours in am all round rear guard action South of SEDDADA until last light, although suffering casualties greatly in excess of ours. 8th Bde were twice Stuka bombed during the afternoon, one enemy aircraft was brought down by AA fire. Sqn concentrated at last light, there had been no movement of the enemy on the 8th Bde left flank.
Throughout the night there was heavy vehicles movement heard moving from SEDDADA to the North. RHQ moved in close to the Sqn. Considerable flares were dropped during the night, but no bombs were dropped.

B Sqn.
Our role was the same as the day before. At 0715 hours the Tps started pushing on and found the enemy gone.
5Tp had a little difficulty in getting through a minefield which was half dummy and half live.
By 0800 hours the whole Bde was on the move, with the Sherwood Rangers the leading Regt and our three Tps out in front.
By 1000 hours we were across the Wadi ZEMZEM having seen no signs of the enemy. 2Tp on the left picked up a German soldier walking across the blue. This man said that he had been in the BUNGEM when Lt Turner of A Sqn was captured there.
At 1400 hours the Bde halted to fill up with petrol. While this was going on 2Tp on the left was attacked by 3 ACs, 2A/Tk guns on Portees and 1 M13 tank. He withdrew onto our tanks but they did not do anything about them and the ACs and Portees withdrew, leaving the M13 which was picked up by the New Zealanders later.
At 1445 hours we moved on again and having gone about 2 miles we ran up against the enemy at X0008 just short of SEDDADA. The enemy appeared to be holding a line running NE and SW through this point, with guns and a few tanks. 2Tp saw 7 tanks on it which withdrew North fairly soon.
The rest of the day was spent in a slogging match between our guns and theirs. While this was going on, our three patrols stood back a bit, but could get very little observation on what was happening owing to the enemy being in a wadi.
2Tp attacked an A/Tk gun position but could not see the result. While the column was refilling, 1Tp Sgt Matheson took over on the right from 4Tp.The battle went on till dark and the Sqn stayed with the Sherwood Rangers at X0008 with 1Tp, 2Tp and 5Tp out in front as listening posts. The Tps were so close to the enemy positions that they could hear the opposition talking and shouting well into the night. Before darkness fell there has been two Stuka raids on the column but they did very little damage. During the night we heard the enemy pulling out.

A Sqn.
8th Armd Bde moved at first light and it was soon seen that the enemy had withdrawn. The Sqn was with 3rd RTR (Col Pyman DSO) and was responsible for forward recce and going recce to the advance tank Regt.
By 0800 hours SEDDADA fort was in sight and it was soon seen that all routes down into the Wadi SOFFEGIN were mined. The Sqn therefore had to find, as quickly as possible, a way down for the whole Bde. This task was difficult as many routes down were feasible but great obstructions were found in that there were impassable sand dunes in the Wadi bed. 5Tp Sgt Green eventually found a route in area R9517 and this proved suitable for the Bde.
At 0815 hours 8th Bde was dive bombed while waiting on the East side of the wadi. The Sherwood Rangers came down into the wadi first as they were on the right of the Bde, this was also made easier as Colonel Kellet had sent Major Laycock to gain contact with the Sqn, so that his Regt could move the moment a way down was found.
Progress across the wadi was slow and in order to gain the good going a route North to R9040 was taken. From there the direction was changed and the Bde moved very fast over excellent going to the DUFAN – BENI ULID track at R5849. No contact with the enemy was made during this period and Bde did not reach R5849 until 1600 hours therefore during the day the enemy had had time to move a column of 2000 vehicles from DUFAN to BENI ULID. This column was in fact engaged with considerable effect by 4th Light Armd Bde from 1700 hours until after dark in the BENI ULID area.
5Tp moved from R5849 SE down to R5048 and engaged a small enemy column. Colonel Kellet sent tanks to assist him, but the enemy withdrew before they could reach the area.
At 1630 hours Bde moved to R4058 with the intention of moving by the quickest route to TARHUNA in order to cut-off enemy moving from BENI ULID to TARHUNA. The going became very bad for tracked or wheeled vehicles and wadis were encountered that needed the most careful recce before routes could be found over them. This was the case with Wadi MANSUR and 1Tp and 4Tp had extreme difficulty in crossing it before last light. The rest of the Sqn spent the night with the Sherwood Rangers in area of R4255.

B Sqn.
This morning C Sqn took over from us. A lot of difficulty was experienced getting across the Wadi NFED owing to the going being bad and it was not until 1100 hours that we got down about 4 miles North of SEDDADA.
The Bde was directed on CHATUA and then to R4040. We found it very hard to do flank guard as the column was always changing direction without letting anyone know.
At 1300 hours we were ordered to proceed complete to BIR DUFAN and seize and hold the aerodromes if possible. Just short of DUFAN 2Tp saw 3 ACs and 1Tp saw 2 more plus 2 lorries, to their East. After further investigation these turned out to be B Sqn of the 12th Royal Lancers who had got to DUFAN an hour before us. After we had made contact with them and seen the situation we found that the enemy were holding the aerodromes in too much force for us to attack so we left the 12th Lancers in observation and leaguered 4 miles South of DUFAN. By this time we were out of touch with RHQ who by this time were close to BENI ULID. All Tps were in.

A Sqn.
At first light 1Tp and 4Tp continued recceing for a suitable crossing of Wadi MANSUR for the Bde.
At 0745 hours the Staffs Yeomanry considered they had found a suitable crossing, but this was not the case, as they merely crossed the North of the position where the Wadi SELSELGHIN and the MARZUH EL CHERBIR join the MANSUR, and therefore two wadis must be crossed instead of one. This fact had been ascertained and reported to the Sqn the previous night, and much time was therefore wasted.
By 0900 hours the whole of A Sqn were in a wadi running in a NW direction, out of this there appeared to be no way, and the Sqn had to retrace their steps several miles and then start over again.
C Sqn found a way into the Wadi TMASLA in the area of GREL BORG and eventually we followed C Sqn steps followed by the Bde. Local Arabs stated that the wadi as running NW and eventually reaching the TARHUNA – BENI ULID road in the area of SIDI COM NASER. They also reported the going was fairly good. As progress out of the wadi was impossible and as there were many tributaries, an arab was collected and travelling on the Sqn Ldr’s car he proved most useful.
For a few biscuits and cigarettes and the promise of some ersatz coffee at the completion of his task, he had the 8th Armd Bde through the intricacies of the wadi. No doubt the powers that be would have been far less confident if they knew who their guide in reality was.
Throughout this day the enemy were withdrawing or retreating North along the road from BENI ULID to TARHUNA, while 8th Armd Bde ran parallel with them in the Wadi THAMASLA. By night a position was reached approximately R9394 and C Sqn captured a party of dismounted Italians with A/Tk guns who had been rapidly placed into a position to protect the East flank of the withdrawal.
One HAC was evacuated in the area of GREL BURG and LCpl Mitchell also repaired a Jeep sump in that area. The whole of B1 with SSM Moore remained in that area, and while there, was dive bombed by Stukas. A near miss to the charging lorry did considerable damage and the vehicle was evacuated. No personnel were hurt, one HAC from 2Tp was evacuated, with big end trouble.
Later in the evening, 8th Armd Bde sent a party of tanks and Infantry to cut the BENI ULID – TARHUNA track at last light.

B Sqn.

We were still out of touch with RHQ, so we decided to leave the 12th Lancers who were recceing DUFAN and push on West. When we reached the DUFAN – BENI ULID road we regained contact with RHQ. We were then told to withdraw the patrols and guard DUFAN until the Infantry arrived.
4Tp took up a position of observation to the West of DUFAN and 3Tp to the SW. 2Tp was sent into DUFAN to look around and SHQ went in a little later.
We stayed there until 1300 hours when we were told to rejoin RHQ by going South until we hit the Div axis and then followed along that. Even by this time no Infantry had arrived, but there were a lot of RE’s clearing mines. The landing grounds were slightly ploughed and there were quite a few mines about. The 12th Lancers had one Daimler blown up when they went in. The enemy must have pulled out the night we were sitting 4 miles South, but we did not hear them go. We hit the axis track at about 1500 hours and then went NW along it.
We went on driving for hours and hours over the most appalling going and through huge wadis. We were so far behind that we were again out of touch with RHQ. On the way one of 1Tp’s cars broke a big end and we had to leave it.
At 1900 hours were ran across Lt Garrad with the Echelon who was also out of touch with RHQ. We brought him on with us and arrived at RHQ who were at Q9696 at 2200 hours. 2Tp and 5Tp broke down and arrived about an hour later.

A Sqn.
The advance was continued at first light and by 0830 hours 1Tp Sgt Trumper who had 4Tp on his left and 5Tp Sgt Green on his right, was in contact with the enemy light A/Tk gun in a narrow screen in area L9304. These guns were covering a small party of enemy MET containing 1 tank and 2 ACs which were moving North into TARHUNA on the track at about L9005. The enemy were burning any vehicles that they could not take with them and at this position destroyed 2 in that manner.
By 0900 hours enemy A/Tk screen had moved North, Jeep Tp Sgt Martin was on high ground to the East and eventually took up a position at 9304, from where they reported a column of 30 MET moving on the track to TARHUNA.
By 0930 hours 8th Armd Bde had reached a line running East/West through SI COM NASER and came under heavy shellfire. It was now apparent that the enemy would hold a rear guard position on the line of the TARHUNA hills, an extremely good position, with command of all the lower ground over which the 8th Armd Bde were advancing. The enemy defended this position with approximately sixteen 75mm guns, twelve 105mm and a few 210mm with the usual screen of A/Tk guns out in a frontal screen. A few tanks were seen on the western flank.
The Sqn was ordered to feel out to the East and to try to make their way round the enemy eastern flank. 5Tp reached RAS SERBAT and reported the ground as being extremely bad, which in fact it was. Sand dunes predominated all the ground North towards TARHUNA and going was virtually impossible, except in first gear. 3Tp remained at RAS SERBAT during the day. A medium OP had been sent out to SI COM NASER and by the afternoon that position held Sgt Trumper and 8 other OPs. It was virtually the only view point of the enemy position and fortunately was not shelled during the day.
SHQ with reserve Tps remained at L9505 in dead ground during the day and were intermittently shelled.
After the TARHUNA heights were eventually evacuated by the enemy it became obvious that in fact there was no dead ground, from enemy OP positions in the TARHUNA area. The day developed into an artillery duel with heavy Sqns of 8th Armd Bde engaging A/Tk guns with HE.
All Tps were withdrawn at night and the Sqn leaguered with B Sqn, Major Turnbull, to charge batteries ours having been knocked out yesterday.

B Sqn.
We were in reserve on the right flank of the Bde. After the Bde had gone 3 miles towards TARHUNA they ran into enemy positions.
At 0900 hours 5Tp was sent to MARCONI. He took 2 Jeeps with him in case the going was impossible for ACs. 4Tp went with him and was going to stay at M0807 to act as link to SHQ. By the time that both had arrived at M0807, 5Tp had run out of oil owing to the very soft going. Lt Copeland left his Tp and 4Tp there and went on another 5 miles in the 2 jeeps. After 5 miles he could see nothing and the going was too bad even for jeeps, so he came back to his Tp and 5Tp and 4Tp remained there for the rest of the day and saw very little movement although they were in sight of the main TARHUNA – HOMS road.
SHQ remained in the SIDI COM NASER area all day, unmolested except for when 4 or 5 guns attracted some attention from the enemy by stopping close to them. During the day Sgt Matheson picked up an Australian fighter bomber pilot who had been shot down that morning.
The Sqn leaguered with A Sqn at L9600 with 4Tp and 5Tp out.

A Sqn.
Sqn remained in the area of B Sqn until 1200 hours. 2Tp had moved at first light to SI COM NASER and immediately started moving North.
By 1000 hours they were in TARHUNA which the enemy had evacuated during the night. 2nd RTR with Cruiser tanks took a certain amount of prisoners.
Meanwhile the Jeep Tp had worked the country to the East, it being easier for him than the ACs and had reached the MARCONI – TARHUNA road. He was ordered to move into TARHUNA. 4Tp at 1000 hours moved to join 3rd RTR and Adv SHQ moved soon after to L8213 with 5Tp.
By 1210 hours 1Tp with the SSM and B1 were also on the move, having being making minor repairs during the morning.
4Tp had been lucky in his move to ABIAR MIGGI, having stopped to talk to Colonel Kellet on route, a minute after leaving him Colonel Kellet’s tank was hit with a direct hit of a salvo of 105mm. No damage was done.
4Tp found the ABIAR MIGGI position untenable the enemy having the position well ranged by guns firing from the pass in area L7017. These guns and an 88mm in area L7715 held 3rd RTR and Sherwood Rangers up during the afternoon.
At 1630 hours the position remained the same, tanks had made some progress but it was thought that good observation on to the road would be extremely useful and the Jeep Tp was therefore despatched Tp Pt. 498 at L7314 which he reached just before last light.
The Sqn was ordered to rejoin the Regt at L8716 at which position the Sqn, less Jeep Tp, was concentrated by 2100 hours. C Sqn Major Burdon had gone down the escarpment after 4th Armd Bde today and were in the area of SI EL GILINI.

B Sqn.
At first light 4Tp was recalled to SHQ and at 0900 hours we were ordered to take over from A Sqn, but by then TARHUNA was found to be clear so A Sqn carried on. 5Tp was then recalled to SHQ but ran out of oil and Lt Pring was sent out to him with his 2 jeeps full of petrol and oil.
At 1300 hours we were ordered to try and find a track down the escarpment running NW from TARHUNA. 2Tp was sent to do this and went up to TARHUNA via the road running up to it from the South. SHQ moved soon after leaving 5Tp to catch up. Capt Lockett could not find any track running NW from TARHUNA so he stayed by a farm just outside of the village and was joined by the rest of the Sqn, 5Tp arriving a little later.Capt Lockett then tried another track and almost got down, but had to give up in the end, although he had got his first view of TRIPOLI in the distance. The Sqn stayed at TARHUNA that night. We were told that the enemy might withdraw from the pass during the night and if he did, we were to go straight through behind 3rd RTR and act as their advance guard the next day. The enemy did not retire that night. The forward link was evacuated that night leaving us with 13 ACs. By this time excitement was intense as to who was going to be first into TRIPOLI.

A Sqn.
Sqn was with RHQ until 1100 hours. At this time the Sqn was ordered to join Major Burdon at SI EL GILINI and if the opportunity presented itself to press North of TRIPOLI. The journey was uneventful. The route had been found by the Royals and 4th Armd Bde had proceeded down it yesterday. This had acted as a threat to the flank of the enemy on the TARHUNA line and was no doubt the reason for the enemy evacuating their extremely advantageous position so soon.
While the Sqn was negotiating this route the New Zealand Div was doing likewise, and congestion on the track was considerable.
4th Armd Bde by this time were in the AZZIZIA area. General Freyberg was met at the grave at L4512 and was given the situation that the Sqn Ldr had. Enemy Air recce had reported 80 tanks in area L4512 at 1500 hours and enemy tanks 30 in number, instead of attacking 4th Light Armd Bde who had no tanks, moved to a position to cover the threat from L4512. The Greys were the only tanks in that area and enemy aircraft must have mistaken ACs for tanks.
Jeep Tp remained RAS EL DRAGMA and gave some information of enemy movements on the TARHUNA – CASTEL BENITO road. Sqn spent the night with C Sqn at L5310. Enemy position at L6420 was shelled during the night.

B Sqn.
We remained in the same place for most of the day. 1Tp was sent along the road to MARCONI with some Sappers to recce. They found the road ok and unmined all the way and found B Sqn 12th Lancers in MARCONI when they got there. They were recalled.
4Tp was sent down the road West to try and find a way up and down the escarpment with Lt Pring and 2 jeeps. After going 10 miles they were heavily shelled and on coming round the corner they were forced to drop back, where they remained all day.
At 1700 hours RHQ moved on a bit so we moved up a bit. In order to get to them we had to go round a corner on a road which was being shelled which was most unpleasant. We left B1 behind until it got dark.
We all reached RHQ just after dark and stayed with them at L8013. We were again told the enemy might move out that night. Our Infantry, the 131 Bde were going to attack and we were told to follow on behind the 3rd RTR when the pass had been cleared.

A Sqn.
During the night 3rd RTR followed by B Sqn and RHQ, had after an Infantry attack come down the main road and by first light our troops were seen to be moving West along the road to CASTEL BENITO. The enemy had again withdrawn under pressure during the night. RHQ were at L5427 and A Sqn joined them there. Two HAC were evacuated in area L52, this being caused by extremely heavy sand dune country in the whole area.
B Sqn by 0830 hours were held up in the CASTEL BENITO area by enemy A/Tk guns and artillery.
At 1030 hours A Sqn was ordered to find a way to TRIPOLI to the East of the CASTEL BENITO road. The Sqn, with the Jeep Tp which had rejoined, moved to SIDI SAIAH and then to BIR LANGAR and were halted there by impassable sand dunes. The day was therefore spent aimlessly in that area with nothing accomplished.
At 2100 hours A & C Sqns, who were by that time together, were ordered to join RHQ in the area of L4740 on the road. By 2330 hours the Regt was concentrated there. Regt was to move at 0200 hours after Infantry had cleared CASTEL BENITO, into TRIPOLI, via the main road. Order of march – B Sqn, RHQ, C Sqn and Adv Div HQ. Brigadier Roberts who had been commanding since General Harding was wounded South of TARHUNA.
Mr Lockett’s Tp of B Sqn led the advance after a clear road that night. At 0530 hours leading Tp of 11th Hussars entered TRIPOLI thus the Armd Regt of 7th Armd Div entered this apparently dead town in the van of all troops of the 8th Army.
Tasks had been allotted to Sqns and on arrival each went to their respective areas. Highland Div mounted on 23rd Armd Bde tanks entered an hour later, with bagpipes playing, by which time 11th Hussars were ‘brewing up’ for an early breakfast. Thus did 11th Hussars enter TRIPOLI first. A well deserved honour after long periods of ‘in contact’ with the enemy service than any other unit in the British Army.
TRIPOLI was empty of enemy except for a few still active at demolitions. The towns folk had all kept to their houses and not a sign of a living person was to be seen.

B Sqn.
We were ordered to move at 0200 hours and caught the rear of 3rd RTR about 2 miles down the main road. We moved along very slowly owing to the road being blown as it entered the plain, and mines being left about. Lt Pring was sent in his jeep to act as a link between Colonel Pyman and the Sqn Ldr.
At 0730 hours when it got light 3rd RTR were held up by an 88mm firing down the road at L4732. 5Tp was sent out to the West but was unable to get far owing to the going. 2Tp was sent down the road and 1Tp was sent to the NE about 2 miles to watch. Capt Lockett saw the 88mm being towed away so he pushed on down the road and took up a position watching to his West and NW. We were then ordered to find out what was in EL AZIZIA but could not get good observation on it owing to the trees, but could confirm that it was occupied.
In the meantime C Sqn had a Tp (Sgt McHardy) approaching AZIZIA from the SE and as C Sqn were now being directed on TRIPOLI this Tp was put under B Sqn. By the time he had got to just within sight of the place we were told we could withdraw him and leave only Capt Lockett watching it. Sgt McHardy was very short of petrol so 4Tp went out to meet him with some petrol and bring him into SHQ.
At 1100 hours 5Tp was sent up the road and came across an A/Tk ditch across the road which was covered by an A/Tk gun and some Infantry. The A/Tk gun opened fire and hit the White belonging to the RE’s and set it on fire. The Tp immediately turned round but in doing so the 2nd AC went into a ditch and stuck. The crew got out and were picked up by Lt Copeland. Two of the RE’s managed to get out of the White and were picked up by Lt Copeland. One being wounded by small arms fire. The other 3 failed to get out, but later that night when we returned to the car we discovered one had been burnt inside, one had been killed while trying to get away and there was no trace of the third.
After this 5Tp was recalled to SHQ and at 1400 hours 1Tp was sent out towards SUANI BEN ADEM to cover the left of 3rd RTR who were moving on towards CASTEL BENITO. He could only get as far as L4537 owing to the going and he remained in observation there. SHQ moved to L4734 and at last light all Tps were called in except 1Tp who remained out.
At 2100 hours when everyone was in bed the Colonel arrived and told us that we were going through to TRIPOLI that night and we were to lead, after the Infantry had cleared BENITO. This made everyone excited to think that after the work and time we had spent out here the Regt was going to be the first into TRIPOLI and we were going to be allowed to lead them. We looked upon it as a great honour. 1Tp was immediately called in and everyone went to bed for an hour and a half more.
At 2330 hours we moved up the road about 5 miles to join RHQ and C and A Sqns. We had to wait there for 3 hours for the A/Tk ditch to be filled in and the Infantry to confirm BENITO clear. This was when we found the White and 5Tp’s abandoned car.

A Sqn.
By 0900 hours Tps had been patrolling the town for an hour and a half and at 0930 hours A Sqn was given the task of regaining contact with the enemy, down the road towards ZUARA.
4Tp Capt Wingfield Digby MC therefore moved West down the road and met the first obstruction in area of ZANZUR, where the road was demolished in two places. Working round each obstruction with RE’s, a position at L2762 was reached at 1200 hours. To this position the road had been destroyed in 6 places. At L2762 the bridge over the A/Tk ditch had been blown and progress could not be made until a bulldozer was available to fill in the cavity. The A/Tk ditch ran North into the sea and South to SUANI BEN ADEM. The Sqn was therefore in the area of this ditch throughout the day.
4Tp moved on to high ground by the sea and while making this an enemy sniping party moved up to the ditch and engaged SHQ. 4Tp opened fire and 1Tp from a hull down position had a good shoot at 2 enemy vehicles that moved quickly West down the road. Colonel Pyman 3rd RTR, who by this time were close up behind the Sqn, sent a Tp of Sherman tanks in case the enemy should try to repeat this incident. 25pdrs also fired into suspected enemy positions West of the A/Tk ditch.
Sqn spent the night with 3rd RTR.

B Sqn.
At 0330 hours we moved off, the RE’s having filled in the A/Tk ditch. The order of march was 2Tp, 4Tp, SHQ, B1 and 1Tp. The journey was uneventful but rather frightening. We arrived in TRIPOLI about 0500 hours and it appeared a dead city, all the windows were shuttered and there was no living thing about, not even a stray dog.
We drove straight to the PALACE D’ITALIA were we stopped until the Colonel came up and we finished his bottle of whiskey and ginger wine, throwing the bottle into the harbour, and then went on to the docks. Sgt Lyon was the first man into TRIPOLI and Capt Lockett the first officer. When we got on to the docks we found the entrance blown so we stayed by a mosque just outside the old city.
While we were having breakfast, the population came out to view us. They were the most awful looking people we had ever seen, just like gnomes, coming out of underground dwellings. While we were having breakfast a patrol of Highlanders came along and cleared the square with their bayonets and then played the bagpipes for us. We moved then, down to the harbour front and waited to move off. At 1200 hours we moved out of TRIPOLI and fetched up at L3563 where we spent the night. At 1700 hours 4Tp was sent down to BIANCHI to find out if it was occupied as the 15th Panzers were thought to be there. He only managed to get a quick look before dark owing to the going, but could not confirm or deny the report.
At 1730 hours 5Tp was sent down to the South of BIANCHI to contact the KDG’s at L1435, but only got half way before dark. Communication with these Tps was very bad, so the Jeep Tp had to go out as a link.

B Sqn.
At 0715 hours SHQ moved down to L3747. 4Tp moved across country and came into BIANCHI from the NE and then moved West along the North road reporting it clear as far as the road to OLIVETTE by 1100 hours.
1Tp went into BIANCHI along the South road and went West until the road finished on the 14 Easting grid.
Meanwhile 5Tp got half way to his objective but could get no further owing to the going. The Jeep Tp was sent out to him and carried on to the objective, but found the KDG’s were no longer there.
4Tp was sent up the OLIVETTE road until he came to the main road and 4Tp North from BIANCHI up the road by the BOSCO MUSSOLINI to the main road.
SHQ moved to L1750 where 1Tp and 5Tp joined them.
2Tp reached the main road where he met on of A Sqn’s patrols and he then travelled West along the road with them.
4Tp reached the main road and started going West along it. He found it blown in 2 places but managed to get round, but at L1158 he ran into a German tank and had to drop back about half a mile and get off the road where he remained for the rest of the day.
1Tp was sent up to the railway to work down it West but ran into an ambush and had to drop back and remain in ob.
While this was going on 2Tp had reached the T roads at OLIVETTE and took up a position of observation on the road between the main road and the railway.
At 1600 hours the Sherwood Rangers arrived and sent some Cruisers up to 2Tp with an OP. By this time the enemy from ZAVIA were doing a bit of shelling. The Cruisers went almost up to ZAVIA but found nothing.
Just before dark, as the Tps were coming in, a small pocket of enemy were found East of 2Tp between them and A Sqn, which the latter dealt with. 2Tp remained out all night at the railway crossing. SHQ leaguered at L1749.

B Sqn.
Our role was taken over by a Sqn of the 12th Royal Lancers under Major Morris at 0800 hours. 2Tp returned to SHQ.
We then moved to BIANCHI next door to RHQ. We stayed there until the 27th waiting for ZAVIA to be out of range of the enemy.

B Sqn.
We moved into rest just West of ZAVIA but found it a bleak spot so the whole Regt moved back to BIANCHI and finally came to rest in the BOSCO MUSSOLINI.

Four Tps each of two Daimler ACs and one Dingo Scout Car,One Tp of three Jeeps,One Scout Tp of four White Scout Cars each holding 6 men.

A Sqn.
Sqn moved to BOASCA MUSSOLINI at 1500 hours and were settled in by nightfall. Again an extremely wet day and damp amongst the trees in which the Sqn was situated.

B Sqn.
Jan 28th – Feb 28th.
Remained in rest and refitted. We altered our organisation to Tps of 2 Daimler ACs and 1 Dingo. We also had one Scout Tp of 1 Dingo and 4 White Scout cars with 6 men in each.
During this time Capt Horsford went to Cairo to hospital, Capt Lockett took over Adjutant and Lt Pring went to RHQ. Tps were organised as:-

1Tp	Sgt Matheson
2Tp	Sgt Lyon, with Lt Welles Cole under instruction
3Tp	Lt Clarke
4Tp	Lt Copeland, with Lt Burridge under instruction
Scout	Lt Newton.

A Sqn.
The Regt complete spent this period in the BOSCA MUSSOLINI, 30 odd kilos from Tripoli, living under canvas, unpleasant with several days of heavy rain. The time was programmed into training, re-organisation and recreation. The men were also allowed into Tripoli approximately twice a week, but as nothing could be obtained there, and there were no recreational amusements in the early days, the men soon became bored with these trips.
Later, however the shops were opened and contained nothing useful at fabulous prices, while a good cinema opened, this the men enjoyed.
The training and re-equipment of the Regt took on a new phase, operating in close country needing a new organisation. Armoured Car Tps were equipped with the Daimler AC (2) and one Daimler Scout car, it being considered essential that for road work, vehicles capable of being driven in reverse should be used. And the Dingo presented a small target, often as an advantage to the leading vehicle of a Tp.
Further to this it was considered that dismounted parties would often be essential for the gaining of information and the Scout Tps in Sqns was also formed. This Tp to consist of 4 sections per Tp, each section of 6 men carried in a White Scout car and with an Infantry No. 18 set for the passing back of information. When AC Tps became held up, these sections would be dismounted and working forwards or to a flank obtain the necessary information. Training therefore in Infantry tactics and the use of the 18 set and 2pdr gun became necessary. Also considerable training in driving and maintenance of the Daimler had to be done, this engine having a fluid flywheel and being differently driven to other vehicles.After commencement of training, troops were taken back to Benghazi for car ferrying parties. Captain Petch DCM commanded this party, consisting of 50 men from each Sqn. Training therefore became extremely difficult.
Capt Churton joined the Regt from the Cheshire Yeomanry and was posted to the Sqn.
Lt Garrard was posted to the Sqn from RHQ.Lt Williamson and Lt Moore returned from hospital in Cairo.
Capt Crankshaw MC took over 2i/c of the Sqn from Capt Petch DCM. Capt Crankshaw had been Adjt for 6 months. Capt Petch had served the greater part of his war service with A Sqn and had been a Sgt in the Sqn in pre-war days. A very bold and experience Tp Ldr he had done great service in the Sqn against the Italians in the first Libyan campaign and also had great deeds against the Germans throughout 1941/1942. As second in command of the Sqn his hard work and experience were invaluable. He will be greatly missed by all within this Sqn, in which he has had such an excellent influence.
Capt Dier of C Sqn left the Regt for UK and several men from the Sqn were posted to Home Establishment, including SQMS Gore.
Sgt Longmate and L/Sgt Hale left the Sqn for other employment.
Football and Pass ball pitches were manufactured and as far as possible the fitness of the men returned. Long periods of work in AFVs not being the best way of keeping men fit.
During this period the 7th Armd Div of the 8th Army had pushed the enemy AFRIKA CORP as far back as the MARETH line, and after 3 weeks occupation of TRIPOLI the harbour was opened and soon was working at full pressure. There can be no doubt that this period of rest and training had done considerable good to the Regt, on the whole the men having been very tired when they arrived, after more or less continuous period of Field Service in the front line since the early days of July.

C Sqn.
Though we still had some 15 men away, we left the Regt to report to 7th Armd Div. Arrived at ZOARA just before dark where we spent the night.

A Sqn.
Having rested and re-equipped and got to like the local Chianti, the Regt was ordered back again into the line, we thought just in time for the final advance, though a fortnight was to elapse before General Montgomery lifted the staring gate.
It was felt that the new organisation was untried and that more time was needed for training, especially in the Scout Tp (5Tp) and to a lesser extent in the Jeep Tp which, though very mobile and capable of ranging wide, may prove vulnerable if mixed up in a battle.
The Sqn left at 0910 hours and with a halt for lunch at ZUARA arrived at BEN GARDANE at 1800 hours for the night.

B Sqn.
We left for the front once more and the day’s march brought us to BEN GARDANE in Tunisia. Tunisia is the eighth country that the Sqn has been in since the war began.
Capt Clarke MC had taken over 2i/c while Capt Horsford was in Cairo.

C Sqn.
Mar 8th – 12th.
Remained in same area – training. Remainder of Regt came up and we reverted to their command.

A Sqn.
We left at 0700 hours and arrived at E7380 at 1310 hours where we were just East of 7th Armd Div HQ, to be held in reserve for at least a week. The Daimler cars had gone well on the journey but the wireless sets had given trouble.
Major Lawson was ordered especially by the Army Commander to go over to the First Army and instruct the Americans in the use of ACs. He was very reluctant to leave the Sqn which he had had for two years (it was also his uncle’s – Major Bertie Lawson - during the last war). General Montgomery said he wanted him to go as he was his best Sqn Ldr in the 8th Army; every man in the Sqn was sorry to lose him.
Capt Reid Scott, who had just returned from being ADC to Field Marshall Wavell in India, took over the Sqn. The CO and he had dinner with the Army Commander the night before and both were disappointed in the low level of conversation which was chiefly about Army wives – a subject on which much better information is always available in the 11th Hussars Officers Mess.
Major Lawson and the Colonel went to see the Army Commander, to whom the 11th Hussars seem to have ready access, while the Sqn made themselves comfortable in a little wadi just West of RHQ.

B Sqn.
We moved on to MEDENINE and stayed about 4 miles NW of it, very close to RHQ. During the two day march we had very few breakdowns.

A Sqn. 9th – 10th.
Nothing happened of any note. The whole Army were congratulating themselves on the battle of March 6th when 52 German tanks from 10th, 15th and 21st Panzer Divs had been knocked out with no loss of tanks to ourselves and only slight loss of men.
The Sqn carried on with 2pdr training, MT training for Daimler drivers, a mine lifting course, chiefly for the benefit of 5Tp, also small Tp scheme for the benefit of Scout section Ldrs.

B Sqn.
At 0600 hours we took over from A Sqn 12th Royal Lancers (Major Spencer). We had two patrols out, 1Tp and 2Tp going out to E6181 and E6075.
SHQ remained close to RHQ.

A Sqn.
The Sqn remained in the same position and there was another gunnery demonstration; 2Tp and 3Tp took part and C Sqn were responsible for the wireless which broke down; luckily 5Tp (Mr Williamson) had brought theirs which worked well.

A Sqn.
At 1530 hours the Sqn less 5Tp left to take over a bit of the line of observation, of about 12 miles front, to the SW of MEDENINE with B Sqn to our North and the Royals to our South.
We leaguered in a wadi with A Sqn of the NZ Div Cavalry; they are grand chaps but are equipped with carriers and were using four Tps on a line where I considered the job could be done by two patrols standing a little further back and taking advantage of the high ground.
The front might be described by an arc with MEDENINE as the centre with the patrols out to the SW watching the hills at KREDDACHE down to ZEBA and SHQ 4 miles SW of MEDENINE and just behind an Infantry and A/Tk gun (6pdrs) screen, held by the Cheshire Regt and the Northumberland Hussars (A/Tk gunners).

A Sqn.
3Tp Capt Churton was sent to do the northern patrol and 2Tp Lt Garrard to E6664. Each Tp was accompanied by a NZ Tp Ldr to show them the ground and points of interest. KREDDACHE and KEF EL ANEBA were believed to be strongly held by units of the Panzer Grenadiers and Recce Group, otherwise the hills were reported to be thinly held, chiefly by small “thug” parties living in the villages whose inhabitants were inclined to favour the other side. The main danger was that the wadis in the hills and the tracks were littered with mines.
The Ghurka Rifles had done a night patrol to KEF EL ANEBA for the loss of one man missing, but 3Tp picked him up in the morning, tired and hungry but otherwise quite unconcerned.
The Sqn Ldr visited the patrols. The ground in between was found to be good tank going – though bad for wheels due to numerous little wadis running NE to SW. The two Tps could just cover the ground, though they could not see each other.
The patrols returned to SHQ for the night having seen nothing of interest except natives and their flocks.

A Sqn.
1Tp Sgt Trumper went to the northern position and 4Tp Capt Wingfield Digby to the southern.
Major Wainman and the Sqn Ldr visited both patrols and met Brigadier Fowler (CRA 1st Armd Div) who was recceing gun positions for a shoot into the hills. They also saw Major Burdon (C Sqn) who was preparing to take over from the Royal on our left, and Brigadier Currie, Commanding 4th Light Armd Bde, who were operating in the hills in a NW direction from HADDADA. During the day several senior officers called in at SHQ for the news and Capt Crankshaw provided a most efficient information bureau with speculations of his own to add spice.
The Sqn Ldr soon discovered that having patrols 6 miles out in front was a mere formality as Capt Crankshaw could see everything in the hills that the patrols could see by standing on top of his car and using his excellent eyes and a good pair of German glasses.
The Northumberland Hussars were relieved by 76th A/Tk Regt and the Cheshire Regt by the Northumberland Fusiliers,5Tp

C Sqn.
One Scout section under Cpl Osborne, newly trained in mine detecting and lifting, left for 3Tp at first light. Their orders were to move West down the wadi along the track till they met a Sapper party who were working from the other end. At about 0800 hours Lt Lovett’s car hit a mine and was damaged but the crew were ok. The Scout section got to work and gradually cleared up the road to the West, picking up the mines which were scattered all the way along, and in some cases very deeply buried and hard to detect.
In the afternoon, Sgt Christmas hit a mine, damaging the car and injuring Lt Champion who had only just joined. The LAD recovered the vehicles but, unfortunately, the Tech Officer, Lt Brown, hit a third mine in his jeep on the way back and broke his nose. But LCpl Lamb who was with him broke both his legs and was pretty bad. The doctor was quickly on the spot and by last light all were back out of trouble.

A Sqn.
2Tp and 3Tp were on patrol. The remainder of the Sqn carried out field firing in the Wadi KHEIL. Shooting with the 2pdrs was good, but more practice needed in working the commander and gunner in co-operation.
Lt Williamson fired his 2 mortars (Sgt Fitzpatrick and LCpl Marple) with reasonable accuracy. I doubt whether we shall have many opportunities of using them.
2Tp and 3Tp reported no movement seen except for occasional explosions. 2nd Armd Bde moved forward into the area below the hills NE of KREDDACHE in order to draw fire form the enemy so that our guns could fire at them. The enemy would not show himself and the party packed up at midday.
Sqn Tac HQ were with the Queens Bays out in front during the ‘demonstration’.
1Tp and 4Tp returned to leaguer with the Sqn and reported no movement seen.

B Sqn.
We handed over to B Sqn 12th Lancers (Major Speke MC) and the Sqn moved down just South of the PAPAHOUN road. Remained there for the day.

A Sqn.
2Tp and 3Tp on patrol in same position. The Sqn is getting slightly bored looking like a cud-face when there do not even appear to be any enemy to interest one.
Considerable maintenance was carried out as the drivers began to discover the points to which particular attention should be paid on a Daimler AC.
Every effort was made to beg, borrow or steal guns for the Dingos and Jeeps which are equipped with one miserable Bren gun each. Capt Crankshaw and Sgt Mitchell were very successful scroungers and we soon had 1Tp Dingo (Cpl Drew) fitted with a .5 Browning from the RAF and 2Tp had twin Brens on their Dingo. 5Tp went out on training every day practising walking, using cover, working No. 18 sets etc.
Except for explosions caused by our Infantry taking up mines in the hills SE of KREDDACHE our patrols reported no movement seen.

C Sqn.
Moved first thing into the hills to E5555. We took over 3 patrols at E5358, E 5156 and E5535. The first two patrols were to cover RE working parties down the tracks which were heavily mined and covered by enemy guns, 4Tp on the right, 1Tp centre and 2Tp on a watching patrol at GUERNESSA in the South. Both 1Tp and 4Tp made quite good progress before dark. They all stayed out for the night.

A Sqn.
1Tp and 4Tp on patrol in the old positions except that they interchanged to give them a change of scenery. Both Tps carried out firing but the area was full of Bedouin.
1Tp reported 3 men walking about on the skyline at E6458 otherwise no movement seen.
The chief excitement during these days of static patrols were certain night patrols carried out by the 1/2nd Gurkhas, 60th Rifles, RB’s etc and the phenomenal amount of aeroplanes that were collecting in our area. We woke up one morning to find about 70 planes on the ‘drome just West of MEDENINE.
Except for a little night bombing direct at the aerodromes in our area, no German plane had been seen for days.

A Sqn.
2Tp and 3Tp were on patrol and had nothing to report all day. The Sqn Ldr went to RHQ for orders in the afternoon. The long awaited offensive was to begin tonight with an attack in the North on the MARETH Line by the 50th and 4th Indian Divs.
The plan included a wide outflanking movement (one of General Montgomery’s left hooks) by the NZ Corps embracing 8th Armd Div, the whole commanded by General Freyburg. The 30th Corps which comprised the 50th, 51st and 4th Indian Divs was responsible for making a breach in the MARETH Line by the sea, through which 10th Corps comprising of 1st and 7th Armd Div was to pass, or better still if all the enemy ran, 10th and 30th Corps would advance abreast. It was claimed that we have a 3 to 1 tank superiority (a moderate estimate). A special route “task” force, including many sappers, was to precede the Armd Divs to deal with mines.
On his return from RHQ the Sqn Ldr explained the plan to the whole Sqn. That night we could see the flashes of shelling in the North but could not hear them. There was some night bombing around us. 2Tp reported a few men in the hills, who may well have been Bedouin.

B Sqn.
20th – 24th.
Stayed in the same position with two Tps out watching the exits from the hills. These Tps came in at night.
While sitting here we seemed very out of the battle and got very scanty news of how everything was going.

A Sqn.
1Tp and 4Tp were on patrol, each accompanied by a scout car (Cpl Pearce and Cpl Williamson) to practice Tp Ldrs in having a fourth vehicle to look after.
The Sqn Ldr inspected the Echelon who were “sitting pretty” in a very nice spot at E???

A Sqn.
2Tp and 3Tp on patrol in the old positions and had nothing to report except explosions which indicated that the enemy was drawing out.
The Sqn Ldr went to RHQ to get news of the attack and learned that the Americans had captured 1000 prisoners (only Ities) and that 50th Div on the sea had about 700.
The line of Infantry and A/Tk guns on our front appeared to change hands at least once a day. Today our old friends the 2nd Btn 60th Rifles took over.

A Sqn.
1Tp and 4Tp on patrol. Sgt Lovett with his White scout car accompanied 1Tp on the southern patrol and went to 4Tp during the day.
At last light the Sqn Ldr visited RHQ for orders. The 4th Indian Div were sending a party to KREDDACHE and 4Tp were to stay out for the night on the road at E5769 in order to give them confidence and act as a link. As it turned out not a soul came near them.
It appears that the great push is going very slowly and 10th Corps was sent round to support NZ Corps, the whole to become 10th Corps under General Horrocks.

A Sqn.
The Sqn Ldr visited 4Tp in the early morning and replenished them. 1Tp relieved the Royal’s southern patrol at E6175, 3Tp was relieved by our B Sqn from the southern patrol as the Sqn side-stepped one patrol to the North. The Sqn moved to E6374 and at last light 2Tp was sent out to maintain a link with the leading Bde of 4th Indian Div (Brigadier Kutch) for scheme purposes. 1Tp and 4Tp returned to the Sqn for the night.

C Sqn.
1Tp arrived soon after first light and had to go to LAD. 4Tp also had a crew with LAD waiting a new car as their flywheel casing had gone; probably as a result of near misses from shelling. Both got in before dark.
Our push on the central sector had failed but General Freyberg, who had been out-flanking to the West, had made good progress and had got 2000 PoW with quite a bit of kit. A new draft of 25 for the Sqn had arrived within the last week and were gradually being absorbed. Regt moved up to area just West of MEDENINE.

B Sqn.
We moved at 0630 hours back to our old Wadi at METAMEUR where we again sat doing nothing.

A Sqn.
The Jeep patrol Lt Moore relieved 2Tp of their liaison duties and 3Tp went to their usual position at E6373.
The Sqn Ldr went to a conference at 4th Armd Bde after which it was decided that A Sqn should relieve C Sqn of the Royals. SHQ went to E6979 with three patrols, 1Tp, 4Tp and 3Tp, on the 60 Grid line between 82 and 88 Northings. 1Tp in the South watched the Royals getting blown up on mines. 4Tp in the centre had a good position of observation on a hill and had a White Scout car section attached, Sgt Lovett, which was invaluable. 3Tp and 4Tp leaguered together for the night at E6387 in order to get to their positions at first light the next morning. 1Tp leaguered with the Sqn.
The country in 3Tp and 4Tp areas was mountainous and entirely unsuitable for ACs – the Sqn will have to form an Alpine Tp if this goes on.

C Sqn.
Sqn had orders to find 4th Indian Div who were working on the left flank of 7th Armd Div, and keep contact between forward elements of both Divs. 2Tp and 3Tp went ahead, 2Tp to the Essex Regt and 3Tp to Div HQ. The Sqn moved later in the day and took over from 3Tp. 2Tp stayed out for the night.

B Sqn.
26th – 29th.
Remained sitting at METAMEUR. Lt Newton went out on the 27th to recce the road through HALLOUF pass where we were likely to go, and returned the same day.
On the 29th 2Tp went and recced a track up to ??? where the Div was moving to the next day. He stayed out all night.

A Sqn.
3Tp and 4Tp took up the same patrol at first light. 3Tp role was to give early warning of any westward movement by the enemy towards TOUJANE and North over the pass at E4989. Throughout the day there was some enemy movement reported in area E5485 and there was a certain amount of shelling at the RB’s and 22nd Armd Bde who were in the low ground SE of REIATSIA.
2Tp was sent to relieve 4Tp at E6085 and Lt Garrard left his Tp near the road at E6486 and went up to 4Tp position to get the picture for the next day from Capt Wingfield Digby MC.
4Tp came back to the Sqn for the night and 3Tp leaguered with 2Tp.

C Sqn.
4Tp relieved 2Tp. Reported the advance of our Infantry patrols through the hills towards TOUJANE.

A Sqn.
The Guards Bde were told to hold the same line – and the North of it – as our 2 patrols, so 3Tp were able to hand over their position at 0800 hours and 2Tp were ordered to stay put but to keep in touch with the left of the Grenadiers who were on the left of the Bde.
A draft of 14 men were sent to the Sqn. They seemed good fellows – one looked about 14 years old, but we did not look at his teeth. They were short of training, so Sgt Turner (2Tp) and Cpl Drew (1Tp) were sent back to instruct them in MT, gunnery, elementary wireless and 11th Hussars ideas. And, at the same time, to command the Sqn’s two spare ACs on the Echelon.Finding one’s way about in this country is very different to the Western Desert and all agreed that it was much easier to navigate on “the blue” than to find one’s way along a maze of tracks, very few of which were marked on the map, and trust in being directed by soldiers who never seem to know the name of their CO in most regiments around us.
1Tp went out at 1700 hours to relieve 2Tp. Sgt Trumper went on to get the lie of the land in his dingo, leaving his Tp on the road. Both Tps leaguered for the night at E6486.
The baths at the French barracks at MEDENINE proved a great boon and a large party was sent in daily. The Sqn Ldr was unfortunate enough to arrive there one evening when the Sisters from the Divisional CCS were in occupation. The mornings are getting lighter as summer draws near and SSM Moore has the Sqn out of bed earlier every day.

C Sqn.
Sqn was recalled to RHQ and arrived there by midday.

A Sqn.
1Tp moved their position forward to E5875 from which an excellent view could be obtained of DJEBEL REINTSOA and the ground in between, which was full of mines.
The Sqn Ldr and the SSM visited the Echelon to vet the new draft. When the Sqn Ldr goes away it seems to be a signal for a move to take place for at 1000 hours the Sqn was ordered to rejoin the Regt in their old area at E7479 to be ready to move through the MARETH Line or through the HALLOUF Pass.
50th Div had discovered in the early morning that the MARETH Line was unoccupied - they had lost touch with the enemy. ARRAM was taken without opposition and suddenly the authorities woke up to the fact that Jerry really was on the run.
The plan now was for the Infantry to advance up the coast; clearing a path through the minefields which was the only danger, though a large one, and for 7th Armd Div to follow up.
We spent the night together in the same place, having heard that 10th Corps and the New Zealanders had had a most successful battle South of EL HANMA.

A Sqn.
The Sqn was hoping to be let off the leash to which we seemed to be attached, to go and chase the enemy. The Infantry were pushing on up the coast and 10th Corps had nearly reached GABES.
The day was spent in maintenance and troop discussions. The Colonel and the Sqn Ldr went to see 22nd Armd Bde.
The air was full of aeroplanes, mostly Kittyhawks and we go frequent Toc/R reports during the day indicating the enemy was pulling out.
At last in the evening orders came for the Regt to move with the Div to Z3322, 6 miles East of GABES.

C Sqn.
Regt moved through MARETH line, now evacuated, to ???. Stayed here all day.

B Sqn.
We moved at 0630 hours to Z3837 where we stayed and 2Tp joined us there.

A Sqn.
The Regt moved off at 0615 hours in the order RHQ, B, C & A to go nose to croup along a well defined track running parallel and about 5 miles West of the MEDENINE – GABES main road.
Our speed of advance was regulated by the speed the sappers could pick up the mines in front of us. As we moved off it rained just enough to lay the dust. It appeared from the Toc/R that the enemy was concentrating his stuff in the Wadi AKARIT where it was thought he might make a stand. The Regt reached Z4005 where we were held up by the sappers, so we halted and spent the remainder of the day doing maintenance and resting.

C Sqn.
Moved North again to area 23520. GABES had fallen but the enemy were holding the line of the Wadi EL AKARIT.

B Sqn.
We again moved 11 miles up to Z3424 where we again sat just in front of 7th Armd Div HQ.

A Sqn.
The Regt moved off at 0630 hours with A Sqn bringing up the rear and by 0745 hours we had arrived at our position which was just North of 7th Armd Div HQ.
The Germans had left very little for our benefit, except masses of mines, but it was gratifying to hear from the local ‘bedu’ that there had been much bombing from the RAF. But what worried him much more was that the Germans and Italians had both had ideas on his wife and daughter.
We were told about the success of the 10th Corps and New Zealand battle and the plan for breaking the Wadi AKARIT line. The 51st Highland Div were to break it in about 2 days time and at last we were going to have something to do, for 7th Armd Div were to follow through the break and pursue.

C Sqn.
Remained in same area.

A Sqn.
There was much chat in the Sqn as to whether it was possible to “April Fool” SSM Moore and get away with it. As far as I know no one tried it except SSM McCarthy (C Sqn) who arrived five minutes too late as SSM Moore had just left to go and pull RHQ’s leg.
We expected to be here for 2 days until 51st Div were ready to attack; but Toc/R reports, which nowadays come in regularly throughout the day, indicated that there was much less MET on the Wadi AKARIT line than yesterday and it was believed that, with the Americans only 30 miles away on their right flank, there was an even money chance of the enemy pulling out; this would be to our advantage as the enemy had DJEBEL TEBAGA FATNASSA which gave him a commanding view over our whole area.
The day was spent in gun cleaning, more maps being issued and some withdrawn, NAAFI kit being issued, clothing washed and general sorting out. The Sqn Ldr and the SSM both received letters from Major (now Lt Colonel) Lawson who was already with the Americans. He said how he wished he were still with A Sqn. Lt Colonel Payne Gallway also wrote from the 1st Derbyshire Yeomanry saying he would be joining us soon.

B Sqn.
We stayed in the same position and sent people into GABES and bathing every day. Tp Ldrs toured the countryside to get the lie of the land.

C Sqn.
At 0640 hours orders to move as soon as possible to assembly area North of GABES. By 1130 hours we were passing through the gaps made in the enemy minefields and across the bridges made over the A/Tk ditches. One of 4Tp cars had flywheel trouble and had to be abandoned. We kept the crew and ordered up a spare.
Our role was to fan out and advance North with the Z13 easting as the left boundary and our right boundary running NE through the ruins at Z1473. Sqn advanced two-up with 3Tp on the left and 1Tp on the right.
At 1345 hours 3Tp reported 8 MET and men spread out between 1278 and 1678.
At 1355 hours 3Tp reported 4 tanks at 1579.
At 1405 hours 3Tp reported these tanks now totalled 10.
1Tp confirmed this and was accurately fired on by a 38mm which forced him to withdraw. He contacted a KDG patrol which gave him information about the left flank.
3Tp was ordered round to the West to contact 8th Armd Bde and the SSM contacted CLY Regtl Group and kept them informed of the local situation.
During the evening the 8th Armd Bde heavily engaged the enemy in area 1080 and 22nd Armd Bde behind our screen also engaged them from the South. Enemy shelling was fairly accurate just before dark. 3Tp remained with 8th Armd Bde and the Sqn got together after dark and stayed with the CLY. The enemy had definitely thinned out during the last hour of daylight.

A Sqn.
At 0700 hours came the order to move immediately as the enemy during the night had gone (just as we had said they would). The Regt moved off and went via GABES, OUDREF and after a certain amount of jockeying for position at ROUMANA we caught up with the leading Regt of 22 Armd Bde at 12 noon in the Wadi RMEL. B & C Sqns were out in front but we could get a good view of the enemy MET which was moving around on the feature KAT ES SATOUR.
At 1600 hours we moved forward and spent the night at Z1469 next to RHQ with Adv Div hard by.
As soon as it got dark we were heavily attacked by mosquitoes, but in an hour or two it got colder and they vanished.
From Toc/R reports and information from our own patrols the enemy was obviously moving most of his stuff North, but was leaving behind strong rearguards of guns and tanks who were mobile enough to break contact at night and move off.
As is always the case in the front line, one never has anything better that a very rough picture of what is happening except on one’s own immediate front, whereas at GHQ in Cairo an up to date picture is usually obtainable – it is the fog of war.
Today it was almost impossible to discover what was happening on the NZ, 1st Armd Div and American fronts, but in the evening we heard that the NZ 17pdrs had broken their duck and bagged 2 Tigers and the 8th Armd Bde 2 more.

B Sqn.
We moved at 0700 hours through the gap in the minefield just East of ROUMANA which the Highlanders had made during the night. Our role was to get across the Wadi AQUARIT and the minefield as quickly as possible and get in front of the 22nd Armd Bde who were pursuing the enemy. This we managed to do by 1200 hours after a lot of delays in getting through the gaps.
4Tp then followed up the line of the road and 2Tp went out on his left. SHQ stayed with the 1st RTR who were on the right of 22nd Armd Bde. Very soon both Tps were held up. 2Tp by an 88mm gun and some Infantry, and 4Tp guns, Infantry and a few tanks at Z2479.
The situation remained the same for the rest of the day, everyone being held up. At last light 3Tp went out to relieve 2Tp and 4Tp came in. We spent the night at Z2174 with the 1st RTR.

C Sqn.
At first light we moved out with 2Tp on the left and 1Tp on the right.
0615 – 1Tp reported at 1483 four 105mm firing SE. Actually they were shelling the Echelon and reserve Tps who had to move out of the area.
0655 – 1Tp reported 7 0r 8 Bredas firing at our planes at 1883.
0716 – 1Tp reported 30 MET moving East with 8 tanks and two 88mm doing rearguard.
0722 – 1Tp reported Infantry marching East and later 4 lorries of Infantry.
0723 – Tp could see Infantry on the ground at 1486.
0732 – 2Tp reported 1 tank moving East and scattered Infantry in the area 1088.
0755 – 1Tp reported at 1784 eight lorries of Infantry moving East, the 2 leaders towing guns. Since he was only 1 mile to their East and they were coming straight towards him, he attacked and caused the crews of the 2 leading lorries to jump out and run for it. He then closed the range and captured 4 lorries, a 105mm gun and a 6pdr A/Tk gun and some 40 prisoners, mostly Italian. During this time he was fired on by a 88mm to his NW and only a short way ahead of 2Tp.
2Tp reported a large tank stationary and firing at 1Tp only ½ mile ahead of him and thought he would attack hull down from 500 yards. This he did and the crew bailed out and he captured two. The tank was a Mark VI Tiger with an 88mm. It had previously been damaged by 8th Armd Bde and left as a pillbox.
0830 – 1Tp carried on into the rest of the column and took 5 lorries and 1 Volkswagon with 2 officers and 30 men, mostly Italians.
0842 – 1Tp could see some 50+ Infantry and 3 guns trying to get out of action a little to his North. He went in and got three 105mm and about 100 Italians. Evidently a Tp of Italian guns with a backing of Germans had got left behind the main rearguard which was obviously German.
After this we advanced fast almost due North till enemy resistance was encountered in area Z2294. There were thick olive groves in this area and A/Tk guns very difficult to spot. At least two 88mm were in action and at 3451 there were three 105’s which accurately shelled SHQ. The only damage was a large piece of shrapnel through the rear-link mapboard, narrowly missing Capt Petch.
The 8th Armd Bde were at 128 1998, but everything was held up for almost an hour as the guns could not be seen. The two 88’s were thought to be in position at 1997 but as they had not moved for some time 2Tp was sent round to the left to draw fire. He went right through the area where the 88’s had been and took 12 Italians of the PISTOIA Div prisoner.
Shortly after the Bde moved on again, with the railway line at 2902 as the objective. Our tanks were again held up before dark by enemy in the 3000 area. In the orchard at 2999 there was at least one Tiger and one other tank in action. To their South there were two further 88’s in action but these moved off North before dark. Just before dark three 105’s opened up and shelled us accurately. Our tanks replied at long range but it is not known with what effect.
We moved after dark but got on a very dusty track and after two Humbers had gone off the track and nearly overturned, we packed up for the night. Both Humbers were damaged but by working till 0300 hours the fitter got one ok and the other a runner, which went to LAD next day.
4Tp Lt de Wend Fenton spent the night with 1st RTR who moved up to the railway after dark. 3Tp was still with the 8th Armd Bde in the Dingo – both Daimlers being worn out – the second one just managed to rejoin the Sqn the next day. Lateral liaison by Tps with different Bdes, proved of great value to Commanders.

A Sqn.
We just had time to get in breakfast before we moved off at 0700 hours with the rest of the advancing Army (how I hate getting mixed up with gunners, Infantry etc of whom we ought to be in front). The enemy was slowly moving off in his own time – he must be jostled!
B Sqn on the right and C Sqn on the left were leading. C Sqn got some guns and prisoners and 1 Tiger tank (a lame one). We picked up 3 Italians.
A Sqn went to Z2384 where we spent most of the day behind B Sqn HQ, and in readiness to move up on their right if necessary to fill in the gap where the coastline branches NE.
At 1500 hours 1Tp Sgt Trumper were despatched to relieve 1Tp of B Sqn Sgt Matheson in front of the 51st Div which was held up by a blown bridge on the coast road and covered by fire. The enemy rearguard here was covering the evacuation of MAHARES. 1Tp leaguered in the area and the Sqn 3 miles North of our day position where we had an excellent view of enemy guns shooting from the area of GRAIBA station.

B Sqn.
1Tp went out and worked up the line of the main road and 3Tp advanced on his left. The enemy had left a few people behind in position and 3Tp was fired on by A/Tk guns at close range from some trees and had to fall back.
By 0800 hours the enemy had cleared out and we pushed on. 1Tp on the right came across a minefield, but with the help of a Scout section got through it ok. Both Tps pushed on with the 1st RTR behind them until 3Tp came across a large concentration of MT at Z2396 with tanks and guns. These were immediately engaged by 22nd Armd Bde and the battle continued around this area all day.
1Tp on the right was held up by some guns and Infantry in a wadi across the main road at Z3093.
At 1200 hours 2Tp went out and relieved 3Tp who came in.
At 1500 hours we were ordered to move up more NW so as to get in front of the 22nd Armd Bde who were going to move NE. 2Tp moved about 2 miles NW and took a position up just in front of the 4th CLY.
4Tp was then sent out to 2Tp’s old position.
The situation remained like this for the rest of the day. Both Tps came in for the night which was spent at Z2294.

C Sqn.
At first light 4Tp and SHQ pushed forward over the railway then NE to 4409 over rough and slow country. 3Tp remained with 8th Armd Bde, 5Tp Lt Woodhouse went to 1st RTR for liaison. B Sqn on our right was held up by A/Tk guns at 3904.
In this close country there seemed to be considerable doubt as to who should move first after ACs were held up by A/Tk guns. If ACs halted to have a look, all the tanks halted also and there was considerable delay before they went on again.
0950 – 4Tp was at 4309 held up by A/Tk and soon after this 2Tp came up on his left at 4211. Soon after 1000 hours we all moved on the Bde axis along a track running NE from 4401 to track junction 5218. B Sqn were on the right and C Sqn on the left with A Sqn on the coast road. The advance proceeded slowly in the face of light rearguards with a few 88’s in area U5321. 2Tp had to do a left flank guard on the road at 4019 whilst 4Tp had gone on to 4717.
At 1530 hours 4Tp reported MET moving East along the road between 5036 and 5535 – first 10 and then more than 50. SHQ moved to his position and it was seen that all three tracks at 5535, 5533 and 5529 were carrying a steady stream of traffic East to the junction at SIDI AGAREB. This junction was made the objective of the Div with the object of cutting off all traffic on the 3 tracks.
Progress was especially slow and 4Tp, later followed by SHQ, went out to track at 5328 to harass and delay. Two Tigers and MET at 4025. 5Tp went to 4824 in his Dingo to fill the gap. Unfortunately by this time we were short of cars. Our two reserves only just arrived and were with B1 as also was 1Tp held up on a narrow track. The forward and rear link and one Daimler and one Dingo were all there were to harass the road.
4Tp went to the East at 5328 whilst SHQ went to 5328. 4Tp at first drew a blank but SHQ met a tank towing a lorry. An OP from 3rd RHA in a Honey tank with a gun strengthened our forces and after a running fight got the tank and crew, an M13 of the ARIETE Div. Three or four other lorries were engaged in the same area and these were hastily evacuated by their owners, most of whom made their escape in the very rough ground. Nine PoW were taken.
5Tp reported further MET moving East along the track at about 5029. 4Tp with his Daimler joined SHQ and stayed back to destroy the M13 with his 2pdr as HACs could not do this. SHQ then went West to the ridge to look for the MET reported by 5Tp. They met it just over the top – a column of 30 to 40 German lorries – the head only 300 yards away.
The column was immediately engaged with good effect, all the leading lorries turning tail and many of the crews bailing out. 4Tp was called up to assist and as he did so forward link had a stoppage and moved back 100 yards to clear it and to collect the OP who did not know what was going on. Lt de Wend Fenton unfortunately did not see the enemy and went right over the top of the hill onto an A/Tk gun. He stopped and engaged it, but after a few rounds an A/Tk shell pierced the turret, killing Lt Fenton and wounding the other two crew, Tpr Pettit and Tpr Webb, both of whom were picked up by SHQ.
After this it was decided to withdraw – which we did just before dark. We were fired on by our own tanks on the way in, but no damage. The wounded were taken over by RMO of 3rd RHA. 3Tp coming in went over a bank and turned over, but without damage. The crew slept by their Dingo and it was corrected early next morning.

A Sqn.
Orders for an advance on a Div centre line which ran roughly on a line of about 15 miles inland from the coast were received. 11th Hussars were to lead, A Sqn on the right, B Sqn in the centre and C Sqn on the left, all minor opposition was to be by-passed.
The Sqn moved at 0530 hours, across very bad going in the Wadi CHERITET with 3Tp Capt Churton leading. We reported a landing ground clear at Z2896 but ditches had been dug across it. B & C Sqns reported enemy NE of GRAIBA, but A Sqn pushed on and gained contact with the enemy at U4503 at approx 0700 hours. Throughout the rest of the day contact was maintained until the evening, in spite of very heavy going.
The country was very different to that which 11th Hussars are used to – we were going through olive plantations most of the time, which reduced visibility to 300 – 400 yards and the cultivated soil reduced our speed to 5 mph. It was ideal country for enemy rearguards with A/Tk guns. On the whole the Daimlers pulled very well.
3Tp located 4 MET (one with an A/Tk gun) SW of CHAHAL Station which they drove off with fire, killing one. For the rest of the morning they chased this bit of the enemy rearguard, culminating in a very successful action at U5514, resulting in the capture of one 75mm A/Tk gun intact, 4 MET destroyed, 5 Germans killed, about 5 wounded and 4 PoW.
At 1100 hours 4Tp Lt Wingfield Digby was sent into MAHARES to link up with 51st Div; he was withdrawn in the afternoon from this attractive fishing village.
2Tp were coping with Sgt Hall’s car which had broken down and 1Tp were ordered at 1200 hours to take over as leading Tp from 3Tp who were low in petrol after the action in the olive groves.
Lt Williamson in his Dingo with 1 Scout car Cpl Pearce had been despatched to act as a link with 51st Div who were slowly advancing up the coast road.
At U4606 SHQ overran an abandoned workshop, capturing 42 M13’s and 6 Italians.
The Sqn’s objective was now to get observation onto the enemy who were pouring East from AGARES. 1Tp and 4Tp moved to X roads U6927 where they spent the night, hoping to intercept anything that came down the road, but nothing came. The Sqn were with Tac HQ 1 mile behind and we were all given a free display of fireworks, far better than any 4th of June show at Eton, by the enemy blowing up his ammunition dumps in the trees at U7227. The explosions were terrific.

B Sqn.
The Div was directed on U6230 and we were leading with C on our left and A on our right. The whole day was one big struggle against soft going and we found it impossible to keep ahead of the tanks.
After going 8 miles 3Tp got badly stuck so 1Tp was sent out on the right. The first rearguard position was soon dealt with by 22nd Armd Bde and while this was going on the three Tps remained in observation but could see very little owing to the country being very wooded.
1Tp tried to work up to the right of the enemy position but his progress was so slow owing to the going that the enemy had long gone before he could do any good. After this the advance continued and we found a track so the two outside Tps were called in and 4Tp and 2Tp went down the track in front of the Bde.
The next enemy position was at U5018 and this consisted of an 88mm and tow 105mm and was again engaged. While this was going on the two Tps in front could get no observation so they were brought back in turn to refill and 2Tp was relieved by 3Tp so when the enemy withdrew 4Tp pushed on down the track with 3Tp close behind.
These two Tps carried on down the track until they came on to the metalled road and at U5322 4Tp was fired on by an 88mm and had to get back behind a ridge. This 88 was engaged by our guns and immediately about 8 lorries came out of a wadi about 3 miles in front of 4Tp and withdrew North along the road.
4Tp Dingo would not start and 3Tp carried on down the road. He went for about 4 miles and came under Breda and MG fire from both sides of the road. He fell back a bit while 22nd Armd Bde was coming up behind. He was fired on again, this time by an 88mm so he got off the road and tried to work up amongst the trees.
By this time the tanks of the 22nd Armd Bde and also their B1 lorries who seemed to have put on a spurt and gone through the tanks, had come up and the enemy opened up with about 4 guns. The Tp had to drop back a bit, and remained in observation for the rest of the day while the battle went on until dark.
At last light the Sqn stayed at U5625 and 3Tp came in. By this time 2Tp and 4Tp each had only one Daimler left.

C Sqn.
2Tp who had stayed out the night came East along the track early in the morning, passing 2 Mark III and two 18 ton half-tack carriers and 20 or 30 MET abandoned on the way – he also picked up a few stragglers, but after getting them on to the Div axis he put them down again as no one wanted them. 1Tp also came in and the Sqn went into Regtl reserve.

A Sqn.
From the previous night’s demolitions it was assumed that SFAX was evacuated. 1Tp was ordered to get observation onto the coast road from U7506 as the Highlanders were well behind our right flank owing to mines and demolitions on the coast road. 2Tp was directed on SFAX itself and arrived with 1Tp not long after at 0750 hours amidst prolonged cheers from the population who swarmed over the cars and made much of Lt Garrard.
SHQ passed through SFAX at 0850 hours and Capt Crankshaw was told by a 51st Div officer – “Well, if the 11th Hussars were first into Tripoli, at least they did not best us for SFAX.” Capt Crankshaw politely told him that we were ¾ hour ahead of 51st Div and already had one Tp 10 miles up the road.
4Tp meanwhile had been crossing some very difficult going and had Sgt Andrews car broken down at U7038, where Sgt Mitchell was sent to repair it.
A Sqn was made responsible for the CHEBBA road running NNE and 2Tp with 1Tp in support with 1 Scout car Cpl Williamson were sent to clear mines. B Sqn were late in getting onto this road (the main road North to EL DJEM) owing to the going, so 3Tp was sent up it with Sgt Lovett and his Scout section. Both roads were mined and blown in many places, but by being careful and by good work of the Scout section with their sapper each, good progress was made.
3Tp found a train of 6 wagons full of German bully, sausage meat and so they helped themselves for A Sqn and remained there on guard until RHQ sent some lorries which, although promised, never came and 3Tp were withdrawn to SHQ in the afternoon.
By 1100 hours 2Tp had reached a point 2 miles South of DJE BENINIA with 1Tp close behind. RHQ told me to halt them just as they were gaining contact with the enemy. While waiting, both Tps were replenished with petrol.
Seven miles out of SFAX there was a demolition at U8746 and unfortunately the Sqn Ldr’s car was blown up on a Teller mine whist negotiating it. LCpl Martin, the driver, was wounded and had his right leg fractured, and so the only AC in the Regt which started the advance from El ALAMEIN was knocked out temporarily. Later a German lorry we had picked up was also blown up, slightly wounding Tpr Cahill, Tpr Hillman, Tpr Crowe and Sigm Wylie.
At about 1500 hours B Sqn on our left had caught up and we were allowed to advance. In spite of mines, by night fall all 2Tp was in CHEBBA after an advance of over 70 miles during the day. 1Tp spent the night there with them, also Sgt Fitzpatrick and the 2 mortar sections who took up their petrol and rations. The local populations of all places seemed delighted to see us, and Lt Garrard who speaks French and German well was able to take full advantage of all information. The Sqn spent the night at MELLOULECHE and felt very pleased with such a successful day’s operations, also the Jerry food to eke out our rations which, though enough, were not more than enough. CHEBBA produced some local red wine which was readily sold.
Four Italian PoW were picked up in SFAX by 2Tp, who got two Czech prisoners from 15th Panzers just outside; they were very talkative and anti-Nazi and were despatched at once to an Int officer in SFAX.It was obvious that 15th Panzers had used our road, for many tanks were left. The total bag of tanks found demolished and left by the road during the day was one Mark III, three Mark III Specials, five Mark IV Specials, one American half tracked White with 75mm gun, about 30 burnt out lorries, three bowsers in perfect working order but empty petrol tanks denoting the enemy was short of petrol and had to leave in a hurry.
The unsatisfactory part of the day was just when 2Tp were about to make contact (they saw a staff car tearing round a corner out of sight) higher authority halted me; the enemy were going quickly but the more they are jostled from behind the more would be their confusion and the less time they would have for mine laying.
The weather is lovely and the countryside gets more pretty the more North we go.

B Sqn.
The 22nd Armd Bde moved out at first light to area U7247 with the Sqn leading. This area was reached at 0900 hours without encountering any enemy. We were then told to move East and work up North along the main road and relieve A Sqn who were doing it. 2Tp and 3Tp went immediately to U8248 where 3Tp remained and 2Tp started working up the road. After going 4 miles he came across Lt Wingfield Digby A Sqn and took over from him.SHQ hit the road at U8243 and 4Tp was sent up to relieve 2Tp while SHQ came on behind. 4Tp took over and carried on up to U7775 where he came across the 8th Armd Bde and remained with them as the link for the night.
At 1500 hours the Sqn was ordered to move East and work up North along the tracks on A Sqn’s left who were on the coast road.
At 1800 hours the Sqn reached U9369 and 1Tp went up the left track and 3Tp and SHQ up the right hand one. After going 4 miles everyone stopped for the night, 1, 3 and 4Tps remaining out. This was an unsatisfactory day as we never quite knew what was happening and we were shifted about all day.

C Sqn.
At short notice we turned out to escort General Montgomery on a parade in SFAX. After the parade he inspected the Sqn, talking to all Tp Ldrs. In the afternoon we went North up the road and joined the Regt.

A Sqn.
I hoped to advance at first light to gain contact but higher authority would not allow it. SHQ and 4Tp moved forward to CHEBBA where we had breakfast.
At 0700 hours the starter dropped his flag and 1Tp with Cpl Williamson’s Scout section moved on and by 1100 hours had reached KSOUN ESAF from where I was not allowed to let them go on. SHQ had tried a cross country way, owing to the mines on the main road, but got badly stuck in mud out of which the Daimlers pulled better than the HumbersAt 1130 hours we were told that the KDG’s were to take over our line and the Regt was to concentrate right back at U7863 20 miles South of EL DJEM – why in the hell? Not to be done down, however, we put in a quick bathe near RASS SALAKTA and arrived at the concentration area at 1500 hours.
The Sqn was most disappointed at being pulled out but hoped that the idea was that we were to join up with the Americans near KAIROUAN. The real reason was that having got SFAX, 30th Corps had done its job and handed over the line to 10th Corps. However, we had had a few days pretty successful operations; the only criticism being that whenever we were about to gain proper contact with the enemy we were halted. We were naturally not told till afterwards that the reason was that 10th Corps were taking over the line.

B Sqn.
At 0630 hours we continued on up North and after going 10 miles 2Tp was sent out along a track which ran North between 1Tp and 3Tp.
At 1030 hours the KDG’s arrived and took over from us and all Tps returned to SHQ.
At 1200 hours we moved back into reserve with the Regt at U7763.

A Sqn.
The day was spent in gun cleaning and completely digging out and re-packing the cars as we were told we would be there for 5 days. A party went bathing, Sgt Mitchell carried out certain repairs and by the evening when we were all set for a 5 day halt, the order came to be ready to move the next day.

B Sqn.
We remained in the same place and a party went into SFAX which was very disappointing. Another party went bathing.