![]() |
| January 1941 | CO: Lt Col JFB Combe | ||||||||||||
| Jan 41 | 11th Hussars (Prince Albert’s Own) | ||||||||||||
| 1/1/41 | C Sqn. A Happy New Year to all. At 0630 hours Sgt Lamb proceeded on eastern patrol but was delayed for 15 mins through engine trouble. At 0815 hours Lamb reported was bad. No movement seen. There was spasmodic enemy shelling during the day, but believed to be mostly ‘registering’ as there was no target in the area. An enemy Bty of 3 guns located ½° due South of the Watchtower at Pt. 177 511397. Patrol withdrew at 1700 hours. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 2/1/41 | C Sqn. 2Lt Crankshaw proceeded on Eastern patrol at 0630 hours. At 0745 hours the Sqn Ldr proceeded on a recce Xtracks 502401 and liased with CO of the Rifle Bde. At 1615 hours Sqn moved to area 50054045 where Crankshaw joined SHQ. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. | ||||||||||||
| 3/1/41 | C Sqn. At 0600 hours a heavy bombardment heard in the direction of BARDIA. At 0630 hours 2Lt Crankshaw 5Tp moved East to observe the movement of the Rifle Bde’s Carrier Platoon and any enemy movement in the area of the road and West of the defences of BARDIA. This patrol worked its way eastwards, crossed the wadi to the West of CARMUS EL MENASTIR 506401 and remained in the area Pt. 158 for the rest of the day withdrawing to SHQ at 1700 hours. The patrol was shelled several times and very heavily on withdrawing. SHQ with 1Tp and 3Tp moved forward at 0930 hours to area 50524019 and remained there until withdrawing to 50224028 at 1700 hours where the night was spent. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. | ||||||||||||
| 4/1/41 | C Sqn. Heavy MG fire was heard during the night. At 0930 hours Sgt Lamb 1Tp moved East and took up a position of observation at Pt. 158 508402 and at 0730 hours was heavily shelled and therefore moved South and took up a new position near the road at 50724002 arriving there at approx 0900 hours. From this position the barrier across the main road at the defences could be plainly seen although visibility East of the barrier was bad owing to dust. No MET other than 4 derelict lorries could be seen. At 0925 hours SHQ were shelled and 3 shells landed within 100 yards of the Ford Utility. At 1500 hours the patrol on the road reported they could see large parties of men walking NW from the Southern camp and more on the ridge at Pt. 177. This movement went on for 1½ hours and was believed to be prisoners (taken by the Australians) being escorted to various places. At 1700 hours the patrol withdrew. Sqn withdrew for the night which was spent at 50224028. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 5/1/41 | C Sqn. At 0615 hours Sgt Scrivener 3Tp patrolled down the track running North from Xtracks at 502401. He captured 7 prisoners in area 503413. Patrol then reported that the area was clear of the enemy. The patrol then returned with the prisoners at 1100 hours. At 0640 hours 2Lt Crankshaw 1Tp patrolled East and at 1000 hours was North of the road, 500 yards to the West of the Landing Ground. The patrol could see prisoners being marched about inside the defences and withdrew to SHQ at 1200 hours. At 1345 hours Sqn moved Pt. 211 on the TRIGH CAPUZZO, replenished and then moved on to HAQFET NADURA 431382 arriving there at 2000 hours. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. | ||||||||||||
| 6/1/41 | C Sqn. Sqn remained in the same position. At 1700 hours moved forward to BIR GUBI and remained there for the night. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 7/1/41 | All Sqns in same position. NTR | ||||||||||||
| 8/1/41 | All Sqns same position. NTR. Capt Lawson and 3Tp B Sqn carried out a recce of area to the North of BIR EL GUBI towards EL ADEM. | ||||||||||||
| 9/1/41 | At 1315 hours the Regt moved to MTEIFEL EL CHEBIR arriving at approx 1800 hours and remained there for the night. | ||||||||||||
| 10/1/41 | C Sqn. Remained in same position. NTR. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 11/141 | C Sqn.NTR. Sqn still in same position. Cpl Harding arrived from Cairo with new fitters 3-ton lorry. He had covered over 800 miles to reach the Regt. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 12/1/41 | C & B Sqns in same position. NTR. A Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 13/1/41 | C & B Sqns in same position. NTR. A Sqn.
C.The wireless set fitted in one of the Guy cars worked satisfactorily. | ||||||||||||
| 14/1/41 | C & B Sqns in same position. NTR. A Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 15/1/41 | C & B Sqns in same position. NTR. A Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 16/1/41 | C Sqn NTR. B Sqn No patrols. 2Lt Halliday returned from Cairo and took over 1Tp whose MRAC rejoined the Sqn. 2Lt Cunningham left for Cairo. Cpl Cobley with a Guy joined 1Tp. A Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 17/1/41 | C & B Sqns in same position. NTR. A Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 18/1/41 | C Sqn. At 1600 hours Sqn moved to a position 3 miles South of SIDI BREGHISE arriving there at 1730 hours and remained there for the night. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. | ||||||||||||
| 19/1/41 | C Sqn. At 1445 hours Sqn moved to SIDI BREGHISE, replenished and at 1645 hours moved West to area GHOT AFRAG 4 miles to the West of BIR ALEIMA and remained there for the night. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 20/1/41 | C & A Sqns in same position. NTR B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 21/1/41 | C Sqn. NTR A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. | ||||||||||||
| 22/1/41 | C Sqn. At 0700 hours the Sqn and one section Breda AA guns moved to U3084.At 1130 hours 3 CR42 flew low over the Sqn and were driven off by AA fire. At 1630 hours 3Tp Sgt Scrivener moved off to recce area North of MECHILI and at the same time 5Tp 2Lt Crankshaw moved to recce the area to the North of 3Tp area. Both Troops carried out a ground recce and remained for the night in square U09.At 1700 hours the Sqn moved to HAQFET SI EL TAIEB. At 2000 hours 3 &5Tp reported no movement seen. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. | ||||||||||||
| 23/1/41 | C Sqn. At 0400 hours 3 & 5Tp started to move back to SHQ and arrived at 0750 hours. At 1030 hours 3Tp Sgt Scrivener moved off to patrol to AURIET EL HAMMAMA. 5Tp and SHQ moved behind 3Tp. 3Tp and the Sqn were held up by a very deep wadi running NW & SE at U0394. 2Lt Crankshaw recced this wadi to the North for 7 miles and Sgt Scrivener South for 6 miles. No way over was found and the Sqn less 3Tp moved back to HAQFET SI EL TAIEB. 3Tp remained in observation of MECHILI and the track running North from it. 2Lt Crankshaw recced the track running from MECHILI to DERNA for 15 miles, no movement seen, track good. 3Tp in observation of MECHILI could not see more than 6 MET to the SW and 4 MET to the East of the Fort. He could see an OP on the high hill to the NW of the fort and a DR kept going back and forth from this hill to the fort. At 1730 hours Scrivener 3Tp withdrew to SHQ and Crankshaw returned from his recce of the track. At 1735 hours Sgt Beard with 2 RRAC was sent to the track corner at U2680 to meet the Echelon. He reached there just as darkness fell but found no sign of the Echelon so remained there for the night and returned to SHQ in the morning. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 24/1/41 | C Sqn. At 0800 hours a CR42 flew low over the Sqn but was driven off by AA fire. 5 dive bombers with an escort of 4 fighters attacked troops within 2 miles of the Sqn. At 0825 hours the Sqn moved to join RHQ in area BIR HAMARIN. After difficulty the Sqn reached RHQ at 1315 hours and remained for the rest of the day and that night. NTR. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 25/1/41 | C Sqn. At 0700 hours 3Tp Sgt Scrivener proceeded on a recce to BIR TENGEDER (U23) arriving there at approx 1300 hours having had mechanical trouble with the front suspension of their MRAC. This patrol contacted B Sqn who were 3 miles to the North of the Bir. The patrol returned at 1530 hours having patrolled 15 miles East, no movement seen. A Sqn. B Sqn. At 1600 hours three ‘ground’ recce patrols were sent out all of which returned between 1800 and 1830 hours. A C Sqn patrol operating to the East of the Sqn spent the night with the Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 26/1/41 | C Sqn. Sgt Scrivener 3Tp left to relieve 2Tp at 0645 hours and to take up observation at BIR TENGEDER. No movement seen except an enemy recce plane circled the area at about 0900 hours and again at 1200 hours. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 27/1/41 | C Sqn. At 0700 hours Sgt Scrivener came into SHQ. At 1100 hours the Sqn moved to area BALTET HAMLA, replenished and then moved North skirting to the East of MECHILI and bivouacked for the night on the track running North at U0595. A Sqn.
At 1900 hours the Sqn came under orders of the Support Group. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 28/1/41 | C Sqn. At 0700 hours 2Lt Crankshaw 5Tp moved North to the track junction at O9736 and Sgt Scrivener 3Tp to track junction at )9128. SHQ moved up behind these Troops. At 0900 hours Crankshaw reported that from his position he could see three M13 tanks and one lorry moving South down the track towards him. The tanks opened fire and he was forced to withdraw to a position ½ mile South of the track junction. SHQ also came under fire and retired to a position 2 miles to the South of Crankshaw. At 1000 hours Sgt Scrivener reached his position and patrolled to the West and gained touch with a B Sqn patrol and then returned to his position at the track junction. This patrol returned to SHQ at 1700 hours. 2Lt Crankshaw remained in observation of the 3 enemy tanks and later the 3rd Hussars and one Troop of RHA arrived to dislodge the tanks. The tanks had already withdrawn. It is thought that they took advantage of a heavy rain squall when visibility was nil to slip away. At 1600 hours Crankshaw pushed forward and observed to the North from high ground 3 miles NW of Xtracks at O9736. He could see some movement to his North in the distance but only men walking about. The patrol returned to the Xtracks at O9736 at 1730 hours and remained there for the night. During the afternoon 2 enemy lorries were seen to be approaching 2 derelict M13 tanks 1 mile SW from track junction O0028. Cpl Macey who was in observation at the track junction saw two men dropped off from the lorries by the tanks and the lorries moved off to the East. Crankshaw captured the two lorries which were then flying RED CROSS flags although there was no First Aid or wounded in the lorries. Crankshaw sent one of his RRAC to capture the two men who had been dropped by the lorries. They turned out to be mechanics who were trying to get the tanks away. The lorries and prisoners were sent back to RHQ. The Sqn remained for the night in the wadi at GABR ALI O0028. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 29/1/41 | C Sqn. 2Lt Crankshaw reported MG fire to the North during the night and at 0700 hours he moved to Pt. 590 O9339 and observed an enemy camp at Pt. 639 O9345 where he could see approx 40 men and 2 MET. At 0700 hours Sgt Scrivener moved to Xtracks at O9636 and then moved West to track junction at O8836 which he reached at 0935 hours. There was a small tank obstacle at the Xtracks but the patrol easily got through and turned SW towards CHAULAN. A lot of men were seen in the area between the track junction and CHAULAN. This Tp captured 1 officer and 50 ORs and 2 lorries and 3 miles further on killed one officer and approx 20 ORs who threw hand grenades at the patrol after first having put up their hands. The patrol moved further down the track and 3 miles from the T roads at )8836 came across what appeared to be a repair section. There was a breakdown lorry, 4 other lorries and a staff car. The Fort of CHAULAN was ½ mile further down the track and a lot of men could be seen in the fort and in a deep wadi NW of the fort. The patrol was NOT fired on. At 0934 hours Crankshaw observed 2 MET moving SW from the northern camp. He could not tell what these MET were but suspected them of mounting Breda guns. A few minutes later these vehicles were followed by 2 MCs and 2 other lorries. At 0937 hours Sgt Scrivener was recalled from CHAULAN to the T roads at O8836 as CHAULAN appeared to be a dead end. The patrol took up a position at the T roads ready to engage the enemy lorries moving SW towards him. The enemy however did not come on and must have halted in the wadi at O8932 as they never turned up until 1342 hours. Meanwhile Sgt Scrivener on his arrival at the T roads found that Sgt Nash’s RRAC had broken a spring which had to be changed at once. This job took nearly 5 hours owing to difficulty in fitting the spring. At 1302 hours 2 enemy MCs appeared at the T roads but hastily retreated when fired at. At 1342 2 enemy lorries mounting Breda guns and another lorry appeared at the T roads. Scrivener engaged this column who returned fire with the Breda and another heavier gun firing HE. The patrol was also engaged by SA fire from the East at the same time. The patrol knocked out and silenced one Breda and killed the entire gun crew as well as scoring a direct hit on the engine of the lorry. The patrol then withdrew eastwards into the cover of a hill. The enemy did not follow and the patrol remained in observation at Pt. 615. From this position the T roads were not visible but the patrol could see for 1½ miles West along the track. During all this time Sgt Nash’s RRAC was still being repaired at Pt. 617 which prevented the patrol from retiring further. The job was finally completed at 1531 hours. At 1600 hours Scrivener moved slowly forward to see if the enemy were still at the T roads. As Sgt Nash’s reached the T roads he was shelled and a few minutes later he ran over a mine. The car was badly damaged but the crew unharmed. Cpl Macey who was moving to the left rear of Nash’s car moved over thinking the crew were injured and ran over a mine himself badly damaging his RRAC but again the crew were uninjured. Scrivener managed to collect both crews, guns maps etc and retired eastwards without further damage, although still under shellfire. At 1745 hours Crankshaw withdrew to Xtracks at O9636 and remained there for the night. Sgt Scrivener with all the crews returned to SHQ. At 1805 hours D Sqn arrived at SHQ and remained for that night and the next day. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 30/1/41 | C Sqn. At 0700 hours Crankshaw moved forward to Pt. 590 and observed the North camp. Sgt Scrivener with one RRAC of 1Tp (Sgt Beard) moved to Pt. 596 and observed to the West. During the day 7 lorries, 3 Breda guns and 4 MCs moved SW from northern camp and appeared to go to area T roads at O8836 or CHAULAN. An enemy OP was established at Pt. 682. A party of approx 30 men with 1 tank as escort were working for 3 hours on what appeared to be an A/Tk obstacle ½ mile South of northern camp at Pt. 639. Colonel Gairdner and the CO visited Sgt Scrivener’s patrol at Pt. 596 and did a recce of the area. At 1745 hours Crankshaw withdrew to SHQ and Scrivener to Xtracks at O9636 for the night. At 2000 hours Sgt Lamb with a MRAC arrived with the Echelon thereby giving the Sqn 3 patrols. A Sqn. B Sqn. | ||||||||||||
| 31/1/41 | C Sqn. At 0700 hours Scrivener moved back to his position from where he could observe to the West and the northern camp. Visibility was bad owing to rain and cloud. At 1100 hours Sgt Scrivener was relieved by Sgt Nash and returned to SHQ. At 1600 hours Australian Bren Carriers arrived in the Sqn area. At 1730 hours Sgt Lamb was suspicious of movement from the East, although it was thought to be Australians. Sgt Beard was sent to investigate and reported them as enemy. Lamb accordingly withdrew to Xtracks at O9636. At 1830 hours D Sqn (RAF) took over the patrol at the Xtracks for the night and Lamb returned to SHQ. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| February 1941 | CO: Lt Col JFB Combe |
| Feb 41 | 11th Hussars (Prince Albert’s Own) |
| 1/2/41 | C Sqn. At 0700 hours 2Lt Crankshaw moved NE to observe the column reported on the previous evening approx 7 miles East of Xtracks at O9636. The patrol contacted the column which turned out to be Australians after all. Crankshaw had an interview with the Australian Brigadier, Brigadier Savage, and returned to SHQ at 1100 hours with the Australian plan and other information.At 0705 hours Sgt Lamb 1Tp moved to Xtracks at O9636 and at 0900 hours moved to Pt. 596 and remained there all day. Very little to report except a little movement in northern camp and at an OP. The camp was ground strafed by 3 Hurricanes at 0830 hours. Sgt Lamb withdrew to Xtracks for the night at 1800 hours. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 2/2/41 | C Sqn. At 0700 hours Sgt Lamb 1Tp took over patrol at Pt. 596. At 0900 hours the Australians moved up and worked to the NW. At 1300 hours Sgt Lamb withdrew to SHQ and at 1330 hours the Sqn moved to area 12½ miles South of MECHILI replenishing en route. At 1800 hours the Sqn arrived at U0367 and remained there for the night. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 3/2/41 | C Sqn. Major Payne Gallway called at 7th Armd Div HQ for orders and at 1500 hours the Sqn moved to a position at I9342 and remained there for the night. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 4/2/41 | C Sqn. At 0730 hours the Sqn received orders to move to MSUS and to recce the BIR GERRABI on the way. At 0745 hours the Sqn moved and arrived at MSUS at 1500 hours. There was a small fort with a garrison of approx 20 native troops. Sgt Scrivener 3Tp engaged the fort from the East while 2Lt Crankshaw 5Tp moved round to the West in an attempt to cut-off the garrison. The enemy opened fire with MG and SA fire which was returned. As 5Tp came up on the West (about 2 miles from the fort) the garrison came out in two lorries and moved NW. the patrol were unable to stop them as a deep wadi was in the way. At 1700 hours the Sqn moved SW from MSUS for 30 miles, arriving X6184 at 2100 hours and remained there for the night. The Sqn had covered 110 miles during the day and were now 30 miles to the SW of RHQ who had arrived at MSUS just prior to the escape of the garrison. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 5/2/41 | C Sqn. The Sqn moved SW to ANTELAT and from there sent out patrols West and SW. Sgt Lamb 1Tp went to BEDA FOMM and 4 enemy lorries moved East towards him but soon turned around and went back. Sgt Scrivener 3Tp moved to SIDI SALEH but the patrol had mechanical trouble so he was relieved by 2Lt Crankshaw 5Tp who pushed SW to within sight of the BENGHAZI – AGEDABIA road and chose a position for cutting the road. Sgt Lamb 1Tp moved West and was in observation of the road at X1079. At 1200 hours the Rifle Bde (Col Renton) and RHA (Lt Col Campbell) took up positions and 5Tp was withdrawn and sent to BEDA FOMM to watch for any enemy movement to the SE. 1Tp at X1079 reported enemy moving South on the road. This MET was dealt with by the Rifle Bde. At 1730 hours the 4th Armd Bde arrived in the BEDA FOMM area so 1Tp and 5Tp withdrew to SHQ at SIDI SALEH for the night. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 6/2/41 | C Sqn. At 0800 hours 2Lt Crankshaw 5Tp moved to X1876 to contact 4th Armd Bde and to observe any enemy movement to the SE. At 1000 hours the Sqn moved to the White Mosque on the road and on the way contacted Cols Renton and Campbell as the Sqn task was to protect the right flank of the Rifle Bde and the guns while they blocked the road. Sgt Lamb captured 1 Italian officer and 13 ORs. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 7/2/41 | C Sqn. At dawn one diesel lorry with 4 officers and 180 ORs were captured. At 0730 hours 2Lt Crankshaw and Sgt Lamb patrolled NW to see if the area between the Rifle Bde and 4th Armd Bde was clear of enemy and at 0830 hours reported no movement seen. At 0900 hours these patrols withdrew and moved South to contact the KDG Sqn who were 14 miles to the South of the White Mosque. At 1100 hours contact was gained and 2Lt Crankshaw was sent further South to a position of observation 7 miles to the North of AGEDABIA. At 1700 hours Sgt Lamb joined Crankshaw and both patrols moved South to recce AGEDABIA. Sgt Lamb moved round to the South of the town and blocked the western exits and Crankshaw entered and took possession of the town. There were approx 200 Italians there one of whom was the Colonel of a Light Tank Regt. He spoke very good English and was a friend of Major Carr 12th Royal Lancers. At 1800 hours the Sqn moved 3 miles to the West of AGEDABIA and leaguered for the night. A Coy of the Rifle Bde took over the town and prisoners. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 8/2/41 | C Sqn. At 0800 hours the Sqn moved West along the road towards AGHEILA , A Sqn leading. AGHEILA was reached at approx 1200 hours and the Sqn remained there for the night. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 9/2/41 | C Sqn. The Sqn remained in the same position and the day was spent in drying clothing and bedding and maintenance of the vehicles. NTR. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 10/2/41 | C Sqn. Still in same position. At 1515 hours Major General O’Conner visited the Sqn and spoke to the men. At 1545 hours Sqn moved to T road 8 miles West of AGHEILA. 1Tp Sgt Lamb in observation 3 miles to the West until 1845 hours. No movement seen. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 11/2/41 | C, A & B SqnsNTR. RHQ. |
| 12/2/41 | C Sqn. NTR A Sqn. Same position. At 0635 hours two enemy bombers flew over AGHEILA and dropped bombs, no damage done. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 13/2/41 | C Sqn. At 0650 hours Sgt Lamb moved to a position of observation 3 miles to the West of SHQ. Nothing to report during the day except the recapture of 24 camels and 41 Libyans who had escaped from the main party at RHQ and were moving West. Sgt lamb withdrew at 1840 hours. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 14/2/41 | C Sqn. No movement seen during the night except that enemy planes flew over SHQ at 2330 hours and dropped 2 bombs. Later 6 bombs were dropped 2 miles West of SHQ astride the road but no damage done. At 0650 hours 2Lt Crankshaw moved to a position of observation West of SHQ. At 1200 hours an attack by approx 8 Me 110’s was made from the East. The attack lasted about 3 minutes and there were two casualties. One MARC and the fitters lorry were put out of action (this was the 3rd fitters lorry put out of action since the campaign began). 2Lt Crankshaw saw a Me 110 force land about a mile to the West of his position and captured the crew. This attack appeared to be launched with much more ferocity and dash than any Italian attack. At 1615 hours 17 enemy aircraft flew over SHQ which had moved 2 miles to the North, but did not attack. They were returning from an attack on RHQ at the fort. At 1830 hours the Sqn moved on to the road for the night. 5Tp remained in observation of the enemy plane all night. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 15/2/41 | C Sqn. At 1600 hours the Sqn moved on the way back to Cairo. The night was spent in the area MARSA BREGA 40 miles East of EL AGHEILA. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 16/2/41 | C Sqn. At 0605 hours enemy planes bombed and machine gunned an area just to the West (it turned out to be the KDG receiving greetings from the Germans). At 0800 hours the Sqn moved off with the Regt to ANTELAT covering 80 miles during the day. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 17/2/41 | C Sqn. At 0700 hours the Sqn moved with the Regt to GHOT DERNA arriving at 1700 hours. Mileage for the day was 110 miles. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 18/2/41 | C Sqn. The Sqn moved with the Regt to an area 20 miles West of TOBRUK covering 120 miles during the day. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 19/2/41 | C Sqn. The Sqn moved with the Regt to a position 10 miles South of BARDIA covering 110 miles during the day. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 20/2/41 | C Sqn. The Sqn moved with the Regt and covered 160 miles to a position 7 miles East of MERSA MATRUH were the night was spent. A Sqn. B Sqn & RHQ. NTR |
| 21/2/41 | C Sqn. The Sqn moved at 0630 hours and covered 216 miles during the day and halted for the night at “Halfway House” on the CAIRO – ALEX road, arriving there at 1730 hours. A Sqn. B Sqn. NTR |
| 22/2/41 | C Sqn. The Sqn moved with the Regt at 0700 hours and arrived at Polygon Barracks, ABBASSIA at 1100 hours, mileage for the day was 75 miles. A Sqn.NTR. The total breakdowns for the Sqn from AGHEILA to ABBASSIA, a distance of 922 miles were as follows:- 6 punctures, 1 RRAC dowel pin, 1 RRAC radiator leak, 1 MARC swivel pin and 1 MARC steering arm. B Sqn. NTR. RHQ. |
| 23/2/41 | Spent in getting sorted out and general cleaning up etc. |
| 24/2/41 | B Sqn fitters lorry arrived having taken out a piston. Journey from BENGHAZI to ABBASSIA was made on 5 cylinders. |
|
RHQ had made their HQ in the Carabinieri barracks at El Agheila. These barracks consisted of a long building divided into several rooms (on the North side of the fort proper) and a smaller building still further North which was the old Officers Mess and was used as such by RHQ. The whole was surrounded by a low wall forming a square. Everything had been quiet since we moved into Agheila and various visitors arrived including the Corps Commander and the Divisional General who were entertained to luncheon in the Officers Mess. On the night of February 13th at approximately 2350 hours, enemy planes were heard flying from East to West and were believed to be S.79’s from the familiar droning noises of the engines. Two bombs were heard to drop about 1 mile East of the fort. The noise of the planes then grew louder and a bomb was dropped in the square about 20 yards from the officers mess. Another stick of 4 bombs was dropped just over the wall to the North of the Mess and a further 3 were dropped in the square. It was thought there were two planes operating. The noise of the bombs dropping through the air could be plainly heard. The CO, Adjutant and Lt Grant Thorold were sleeping in the Mess and had a narrow escape from the first bomb which dropped outside the Mess. Splinters shattered the door and fetched up in the walls inside the room in which they were sleeping. One fragment went straight through Lt Grant Thorold’s trousers which were hanging on a chair beside his bed. Windows were broken and plaster shaken from the walls and ceiling. The remainder of the officers and crews of the forward and rear link ACs were sleeping in the building on the South side of the square; which shook in a most alarming manner. The planes, after having dropped their bombs, continued to fly over the area for some time and did not leave until approx 0040 hours, after having dropped another stick of bombs about 5 miles to the West of the fort, the road presumably being the target. It was not hit. This night attack was a new and unpleasant experience for us and it was therefore decided that perhaps the desert was the best place after all, despite the unaccustomed comfort oh having a roof over our heads. RHQ was ordered to move out on the afternoon of February 14th so as to be right clear of the fort by night. Accordingly Major WI Leetham and Lt HC Roberts went off the next morning accompanied by Major O’Brien Butler RHA and Capt Temple RHA to reconnoitre a suitable spot in the desert to the South of the road. There was a bad dust storm that morning and visibility was bad. B Sqn; whose position was 3 miles SE of the fort, were, at about 1200 hours, suddenly dived on and machine gunned by 15 Me 110’s which succeeded in setting two B vehicles on fire – one belonging to B Sqn and one to the section of Breda AA Guns attached to them. However there were no casualties of personnel. The attack was very sudden and unexpected, especially in view of the bad weather. Owing to the dust it was difficult to see where the planes came from. After having dealt with B Sqn the planes then flew over the fort and the aerodrome, machine gunning everything in sight including the concrete hanger. The R.MO (Lt Hartnell) and the OME (Capt Ames) were in the hanger at the time and said it was most unpleasant as the bullets not only came through the roof but that the planes were “front gunning” through the open doors of the hanger. At the time there was a lot of Italian SA ammunition stored in the hanger. The planes were flying at an altitude of 150 – 200 feet. The Sqn of KDG had 4 men wounded when lying under their ACs and the RAF Sqn one man wounded, none of them seriously. A & C Sqns, who were also South of the road were not neglected and several cars of C Sqn were hit and the armour pierced on one car in many places. “Cannon Guns” were used by some of the planes but failed to penetrate the armour plating, only making large dents. The Officers Mess square also received its share of attention and the rear link received a bullet in the spare tyre and a nasty dent in the back. The Adjutant and Lt Grant Thorold were in the mess at the time (reading the Tatler) and were forced to find some better cover than a very thin plaster roof. These planes were engaged by 4/106 Bty RHA’s Breda guns, SA fire and the three Bofors guns. One plane was shot down and two others reported damaged. The plane shot down forced landed about 12 miles to the West of the fort and about ¾ mile to the West of a patrol of C Sqn commanded by 2Lt Crankshaw. 2Lt Crankshaw’s Troop had not been left out of the fun and some of his tyres were punctured. He watched the plane on the ground and said that the other planes machine gunned it on their way home. As soon as he was mobile he proceeded to the plane to collect the crew, which consisted of a WO pilot, and a wireless operator LCpl, both of whom were unhurt. The pilot spoke some English and explained his desire to be taken to the Commandant. Lt Crankshaw sent Cpl Chambers to investigate the plane and see if there was anyone else in it and to collect any documents there might be. The pilot showed considerable agitation at this move and by word and gesture intimated that the plane might explode. The plane was not badly damaged, except for a burst petrol tank on the near side and a Breda shell through the near side engine cowling which had severed some oil pipes. The pilot was carrying various paper, the most interesting of which was a large map on which a course was marked in pencil. The starting point was MUNICH and the finish was a circle on the map at a point South of MISURATA. The route was via VENICE, NAPLES, SICILY and TRIPOLI. He also had some hotel labels of a hotel in NAPLES and various snapshots obviously taken somewhere in Italy as the girls appearing in the various groups were quite definitely not of a pure Nordic type. Both the pilot and the operator were inclined to be surly and would not talk, the pilot denying any knowledge of English. He asked QMS White (who speaks a little German) how long he was going to be kept at AGHEILA and on being told “about a week” his face dropped quite a long way, which is not surprising in view of subsequent events. On the afternoon of Feb 14th, at about 1615 hours, the Adjutant was busy in the orderly room writing the report of the previous raids when a message came through from C Sqn over the wireless to the effect that 20 unidentified planes were flying from West to East, South of the road. All guns were manned and everyone possible warned. It was not possible to warn other Sqns as CW was not being kept. Within a very few minutes of the warning being received the attack on the fort commenced and the fort received their undivided attention, the other Sqns not being favoured. The formation consisted of Ju 87 dive bombers and they attacked from the East. The attack was very heavy and consisted of dive bombing and then machine gunning; and lasted for 10 minutes. One of RHQ’s ACs was hit and set on fire. The crew, consisting of Sgt Lucy, Tpr Buckler and Tpr Vivier being instantly killed. A RAF officer who witnessed the attack from the South of the road stated that the planes approached in echelon to starboard formation at approx 8,000 feet; taking full advantage of the sun. when over the target the leader broke formation, dived and released his bomb at approx 1,500 feet. He then pulled out and did a steep climbing turn into the sun. this procedure was adopted in turn by the remainder of the formation and when the last plane had pulled out the leader did a shallow dive out of the sun and front gunned the target from 1,000 feet, followed by the remainder of the formation. Our guns did very good work – not only the Breda but the Brens as well. LCpl Dawson and LCpl Lee were manning their guns and firing during the whole attack. The RAF officer also stated that he thought the pilots were forced to carry out their front gunning attack from 1.000 feet because of the hot resistance in the form of AA from the ground. He also stated that the drill was extremely good, well executed and polished, which would seem to indicate that they were first line pilots, probably as good as our own. During this action one Ju 87 had its tail shot off by a Breda gun and crashed just South of the hanger. The pilot attempted to jump as his parachute was open, but he was too low and was killed. The rear gunner, however, landed safely and was captured. He was a 1st Class WO and had the Iron Cross. Sgt Moore of X Troop Royal Signals, who was in a good position from which to watch the attack, saw the wings fall off another plane and black smoke pouring from it. It is believed that this plane fell into the sea as the SSM of C Sqn saw the same plane with the smoke coming from it go down over the dunes in the direction of the sea. The bombs which were dropped appeared to be heavier (judging from the noise) than those dropped the previous night, but on examining the places where they were seen to fall, there was not a sign of any crater and the fragmentation appeared very good. Fragments could be heard and seen kicking up the sand which had drifted against the wall and appeared to travel about 2 feet above the ground. RHQ moved very shortly after this attack to a position about 1 ½ miles to the SW of the fort. Slit trenches were dug and one of the most willing and enthusiastic workers was the captured German. On February 15th a further attack was made on the fort at 1200 hours by 12 planes – Messerschmidts and Junkers. They approached from the West, flying much higher than previously, circled the fort and then dive bombed and machine gunned it. They appeared to be using heavier bombs than the previous evening although eye witnesses from other Sqns state that the attack was very similar to the previous one and was, if anything, not quite so savage. However; those who were there on the previous day and who were watching this attack with considerable satisfaction from deep slit trenches could hardly credit that anyone could have lived through such a hellish inferno. There were 3 men from LAD in the fort during this last attack but they were all unhurt. One plane was reported as having been shot down and one damaged during this raid, but they were not found. |
| March 1941 | CO: Lt Col JFB Combe |
| Mar 41 | 11th Hussars (Prince Albert’s Own) |
| 9/3/41 | Major K Alexander and Lt HLF Ward arrived as advance party to the draft from England. |
| 10/3/41 | Major AT Smail, Lt H Petch DCM. 2Lt L Jacobson, 2Lt GK Burness, 2Lt AJL Smithers 2Lt RA Rapp and 129 ORs joined the Regt from England. Of the 129 ORs, 43 were 11th Hussars reservists who had been serving with various other regiments since the outbreak of war. Many of them had previously served with the Regt in Egypt. |
|
Since the return of the Regt on February 22nd, training started with a vengeance on Feb 24th. There were Regtl classes for Diver Mechanics, Driver Operators and Breda Gun, and drill etc. owing to the arrival of 8 extra officers, various changes in organisation were made on the basis of the new War Establishment. Major Smail took over A Sqn and Capt AVC Robarts became 2i/c. Major K Alexander took over RHQ Sqn from Lt HC Roberts with Lt DPJ Lloyd MC as 2i/c. Lt HC Roberts became Intelligence Officer and Lt JEM TRayner was also attached to the Sqn. Capt HLF Ward took over as 2i/c C Sqn in lieu of Capt HS Cayzer who reverted to the rank of Lt. Lt JAN Crankshaw MC became Technical Officer in lieu of Capt Grant Thorold. Training progressed favourably and all ranks enjoyed cricket and football and the amenities of Cairo when on the 31-3-41 orders came through for the Regt to take over a number of guard duties in the Cairo Sub-area from the 1st KRRC who were ordered into the field at short notice. This seriously interfered with training as the various guards and garrison employed personnel was over 200. However, a certain amount was still carried on. The Regt also had to find a permanent guard consisting of 1 Sgt and 16 ORs for the POW camp at Warren Camp Abbassia where there were approx 120 Italian prisoners. Lt HS Cayzer was Commandant of this camp and an officer commanded the guard which changed ever 24 hours. This officer was permanently on duty and only left the camp for meals. A fatigue party of 20 prisoners worked in barracks every day and did their work cheerfully and well. This guard as well as all the Cairo guards and garrison duties were taken over by the Royals when the Regt received orders to move. The Regt then received orders to move and left for Cyrenaica on April 5th. Major Smail remained behind as OC “Details” with Capt DPJ Lloyd MC as Adjutant (he was still on light duties owing to his wounds). Lt JEM Trayner (who had a back injury and was graded unfit for the Field) took over RHQ Details. Capt HLF Ward took over C Sqn Details. Capt P Arkwright (awaiting passage to Home Establishment) PMC and A Sqn Details. Lt HC Roberts (awaiting transfer to Trans-Jordan Frontier Force) was employed writing the War Diary. Capt W Wainman and B Sqn officers – less Lt WVH Gape MC who had been lent to RHQ and 2Lt AJL Smithers C Sqn and 2Lt L Jacobson A Sqn were left out of battle.
|
| April 1941 | CO: Lt Col WI Leetham | ||||||||||||||
| Apr 41 | 11th Hussars (Prince Albert’s Own) | ||||||||||||||
| 3/4/41 | Lt Col Combe DSO was suddenly called to Libya and accompanied Major General Sir Richard O’Conner owing to the easterly advance of a mixed German – Italian force. Lt Col Combe had already been promoted Brigadier (March 3rd) so Major Leetham assumed command as Lt Col. Capt Grant Thorold became Adjutant (he was actually appointed on October 14th 1940 but the appointment was not officially notified to the Regt until March 5th 1941 and since that date Capt Wainman had been carrying on as Adjutant to help Capt Grant Thorold with training etc). On this date Capt Wainman took over command of B Sqn from Major AG Miller who had been posted to the Home Establishment. Capt AVC Robarts took over A Sqn from Major Smail who became 2i/c of the Regt. On the same date, about 1400 hours, the Regt was ordered to be ready to move and was placed on 4 hours notice wef midnight. This came as a great shock to us all. The vehicles had been handed in to Ordnance. A certain number of Marmon Harrington ACs were taken over from the 1st Royal Dragoons (who were being trained as an Armoured Car Regt) and the rest of the ACs sufficient to give the Sqns 4 troops of 3 cars each plus 2 for SHQ and 4 for RHQ. Transport were also drawn up. The work of fitting out the vehicles was carried out at high speed. Fresh orders were received putting the Regt on 4 hours notice from 1400 hours on 4th April. | ||||||||||||||
| 4/4/41 | The whole day and most of the night was spent in loading and fitting out the vehicles. | ||||||||||||||
| 5/4/41 | The Regt moved (destination TOBRUK) at 0600 hours (less B Sqn who remained behind) and was organised as follows:-
| ||||||||||||||
| 7/4/41 | Major AG Miller left by air for England. |
| May 1941 | CO: Lt Col WI Leetham |
| May 41 | 11th Hussars (Prince Albert’s Own) |
| 4/5/41 | C Sqn. TSM Scrivener relieved Lt Burdon an western patrol. 5Tp Sgt Smedley was shelled from BIR SILWAYAT and forced to withdraw. Enemy then stopped shelling and the patrol returned to its original position. Sqn Ldr and Major Christopher RHA made a recce of ALAM BATTUMA at 1130 hours, but could not locate the guns. At 1730 hours on of our columns arrived in the ALAM BATTUMA area. At 2010 hours 3 MET appeared at 522358 and a few minutes later 2 MET appeared at 519358. The 3 MET then moved West and joined the 2 MET. As it got dark the 5 MET were seen moving slowly northwards. At 2030 hours 5Tp Sgt Smedley was again shelled in the ALAM BATTUMA area. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. A quiet day. |
| v5/5/41 | C Sqn. At 0610 hours 4Tp Sgt Peacock relieved 5Tp Sgt Smedley at ALAM BATTUMA. At 0831 hours TSM Scrivener at ALAM EL ARAD reported 5 AFVs, 1 gun and 4 ACs at 522352 making West. One large tank was also seen making down the track towards KHREIGAT. SHQ moved to 538228. At 0902 hours 4 AFVs and one gun moving down 521 Grid line. Position at 0910 hours 521348. TSM Scrivener forced to withdraw to QUARET REMLIYAT area.At 0912 hours the 4 AFVs and 1 gun reported stationary were due East of KHREIGAT and at 0921 hours they turned and chased 2Tp, making him withdraw further to the SE. At 0940 hours they were reported stationary at 527345 and some MET at BIR KHREIGAT. At 1000 hours 4Tp Sgt Peacock at ALAM BATTUMA withdrew ALAM MADAN with a column. His position was 536345. He passed all information to Major Goschen and remained with him until the column moved West at approx 1200 hours. At 1035 hours 2Tp TSM Scrivener reported 5 MET at RUWEIBIT with 1 AFV. One mile South of these, 5 MET, which were joined by 6 more MET at 1101 hours. At 1427 hours the column shelled the enemy in QUARET EL REMLIYAT area and forced them to withdraw. 2Tp pushed North again to QUARET EL RAMLIYAT and at 1709 hours took Major Goschen over to A Sqn patrol. 2Tp then moved to Pt. 207 530347, arriving there at 1810 hours. He reported 6 MET in area 525352, otherwise no movement seen. At 1730 hours 4Tp Sgt Peacock moved to area HAQFET MADAN and took up position of observation at Pt. 200, no movement seen. At 2000 hours Western patrol remained the night in area Pt. 207 530347 and Eastern patrol at Pt. 200 537350. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 6/5/41 | C Sqn. At 0550 hours SHQ moved to 536333. No movement seen during the night except for the odd Verey lights at KHREIGAT and SULEIMAN. At 0610 hours 3Tp Lt Burdon relieved 2Tp TSM Scrivener at Pt. 207. At 0800 hours no movement seen by all patrol area except for 2 MET at V tracks 522357. At 0905 hours bad sandstorm started which continued all day, visibility limited to 25 yards at times. NTR all day. At 1800 hours Eastern patrol went forward to ALAM BATTUMA and reported no movement seen. Western patrol moved forward to Pt. 205 and reported no movement seen. At 2000 hours nothing further to report. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 7/5/41 | C Sqn. At 0555 hours SHQ moved to 530331. No movement seen during the night. During the day there was little movement to report except for 3 AFVs at Pt. 205 522356 which were forced to withdraw by shellfire from a column. At 2000 hours nothing further to report. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 8/5/41 | C Sqn. At 0605 hours 4Tp Sgt Peacock attached to Lt Col Campbell’s HQ as communication between our patrols and Lt Col Campbell’s. Sgt peacock remained at QUARET EL RUWEIBIT all day and returned to SHQ which moved to QUARET RAMLIYAT at 2200 hours. At 0610 hours 3Tp Lt Burdon moved forward to 523359 and remained in observation all day. He reported very little movement all day and at 2200 hours withdrew 2 miles SE on report from A Sqn that there were 7 enemy tanks at SIDI SULEIMAN. At 1000 hours 5Tp Sgt Smedley in ALAM BATTUMA area was shelled from HALFAYA area. At 1330 hours OP went up to Sgt Smedley and patrol, and pushed on to BIR SILWEIYAT which was not occupied. The enemy ACs at 528362 withdrew. The patrol remained at BIR SILWEIYAT while the column put a barrage on to HALFAYA and then attacked it with four 2pdrs and 11 Carriers. They suffered 4 casualties and it appeared that HALFAYA was stronger held than previously thought. At 1200 hours the Sqn Ldr visited Lt Col Campbell and owing to wireless communications being very bad at HQ, Sgt Saunders and the 3rd car of SHQ was attached to a column. At 1945 hours Lt Col Campbell reported 3 enemy tanks in BIR KHREIGAT area and 7 enemy tanks moving NE along SHEFERZEN – SIDI SULEIMAN track. A confused two hours followed, not improved by Lt Col Campbell’s own wireless set breaking down. However by 2200 hours the situation was quite normal, and although 3Tp was fired on by some MET, at 2245 hours, at 100 yards range, there were fortunately no casualties. The MET were probably a party of 2pdrs on their way to V track 522358 which had been warned of 3Tp position. At 2330 hours – nothing further to report. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 9/5/41 | C Sqn. No movement seen during the night. At 0600 hours 4Tp Sgt Peacock moved to contact Lt Col Campbell’s HQ for wireless comms purposes at BIR KHREIGAT. At 0605 hours 2Tp TSM Scrivener moved to relieve 3Tp at 523356. A Sqn reported an enemy column had crossed the wire at EGYPTIAN SIDI OMAR consisting of 6 ACs, 11 AFVs, 1 lorry, 1 MC and 1 staff car. This column moved East along the 357 Grid line. At 0930 hours a bad sandstorm started and orders were received to withdraw and hold a line of observation ALAM BATTUMA – KHREIGAT. At the same time 4Tp Sgt Peacock came back under command and moved forward to V track 519354. He was relieved at this position at 1100 hours by a patrol of A Sqn and he then returned to SHQ. Meanwhile 2Tp had been withdrawn to Pt. 205 522357 and picked up a small party of the column who were walking. They informed TSM Scrivener that a 25pdr and its tractor unit were 1 mile West of his position. 2Tp went forward and towed them out and also recovered an ammunition limber which was found abandoned. They towed them away and eventually arrived at SHQ where a RA officer picked them up. At 1505 hours 2Tp TSM Scrivener moved back to ALAM EL ARAD and was relieved by 4Tp at 1820 hours as one of his MHACs was giving trouble. At 1800 hours visibility still very bad owing to sandstorm, and at 2000 hours nothing further to report. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 10/5/41 | C Sqn. No movement seen during the night except for a white Verey light seen in Halfaya area at 0145 hours. At 0605 hours 2Tp TSM Scrivener left to relieve 5Tp Sgt Smedley at ALAM BATTUMA. Sgt Gander had repaired 2Tp’s car during the night. At 0805 hours 5Tp at ALAM BATTUMA was shelled from HALFAYA for 10 minutes by guns – approx 25pdrs. Three ACs appeared at SILWEIYAT area and remained there all day. At 0900 hours Sgt Peacock at ALAM ARAD reported no movement seen. At 1715 hours 4Tp Sgt Peacock patrolled to V tracks North of RUWEIBIT WARRANI to look for any men of the RHA who might be in that area. The patrol encountered 3 enemy ACs and engaged them with Breda, Bren and Boyes guns, driving them away. 4Tp then returned to ALAM EL ARAD at 1905 hours. At 2000 hours – nothing further to report. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 11/5/41 | C Sqn. No movement seen during the night. At 0600 hours 3Tp Lt Burdon relieved 4Tp Sgt Peacock at ALAM EL ARAD.At 0800 hours no movement seen by both patrols. Major Pepys and A Sqn of the Royals arrived at 1200 hours. At 1330 hours 2Tp of the Royals Sqn went to ALAM BATTUMA and took over from 2Tp. TSM Scrivener himself remained with the Royals Tp and instructed them. At 2000 hours nothing further to report. A Sqn. B Sqn. |
| 12/5/41 | C Sqn. Movement of tracked vehicles heard during the night by both patrols. At 0557 hours 3Tp Lt Burdon reported 20 MET at ALAM EL ARAD stationary. This was confirmed by TSM Scrivener at ALAM BATTUMA, who could also see 40 MET in SIDI SULEIMAN area at 0615 hours. At 0619 hours Lt Burdon reported that 10 MET of the 20 at ALAM EL ARAD were moving SSE. He could see about 30 MET stationary behind the 10 moving MET, which were AFVs. He thought they were medium tanks. The remainder of the MET then appeared to start moving, and the whole column led by 10 tanks moved slowly SE. after 10 minutes the column halted but the advance guard of 10 tanks moved on ESE and at 0700 hours were 1 mile East of QUARET RAMLIYAT. At 0820 hours 3Tp Lt Burdon reported the whole column moving SE again and kept in touch with the column until 0947 hours when he reported it was being led by 30 tanks and moving East – head 1 mile North of BIR ZAGDIN EL ABIYAD 539337. At 1020 hours touch was lost with the column and never regained. Column appeared to turn North and then NW and Lt Burdon was engaged by what he thought to be an enemy rearguard and was forced to withdraw. Meanwhile TSM Scrivener had withdrawn SE along the line of the escarpment and took up a pos of observation at Pt. 221 565335. 5Tp Sgt Chambers was at BIR KHREIGAT when enemy started advancing at 0619 hours and this patrol withdrew along the line of the KHREIGAT – HAMRA – HABATA track. SHQ was eventually established 7 miles East of BIR HABATA. At 1650 hours 3Tp Lt Burdon patrolled West to ILWET MAWI 543343 and reported no movement seen, returning at 2000 hours. At 2015 hours 3Tp Lt Burdon at Pt. 221 555335 and 5Tp Sgt Chambers at 557330 remained there for the night. 2Tp Royals and 4Tp with SHQ 7 miles East of BIR HABATA. 2100 hours – nothing further to report. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 13/5/41 | C Sqn. No movement seen during the night. At 0605 hours 4Tp Sgt Peacock relieved 3Tp Lt Burdon at Pt. 221. At 0610 hours 5Tp Sgt Chambers patrolled forward to ALAM EL ARAD and 4Tp to ALAM BATTUMA. At 1210 hours 4Tp went forward to BIR SILWEIYAT. No movement seen until after 30 minutes when he was engaged be 2 ACs and had to move slightly. At 1535 hours 3 more MET, possibly tanks joined the two MET already in position at 527364 and engaged Sgt Peacock again and he was forced to withdraw to ALAM BATTUMA. No movement seen both patrols at 1600 hours. SHQ moved to QUARET RAMLIYAT and withdrew to ALAM FAKHRI and remained there for the night. A Sqn. B Sqn. RHQ.Moved at first light to HABATA, the enemy having retired, and then back to HAMRA, |
| 14/5/41 | C Sqn. No movement seen during the night. 1Tp Sgt Beard relieved Sgt Chambers 5Tp at ALAM EL ARAD. No movement seen all day except for 2 ACs at BIR SILWEIYAT which observed 4Tp Sgt Peacock all day, and 4 AFVs in V tracks North of KHREIGAT. At 1930 hours 2Tp Lt Burdon moved to ALAM EL ARAD in readiness for a recce at 0530 hours on the 15th. 2000 hours – nothing further to report. B Sqn. RHQ. |
| 15/5/41 | C Sqn. At 0530 hours SHQ moved to ALAM EL ARAD and were joined by Sgt Peacock who had been relieved by the Guards Bde at ALAM BATTUMA. At 0555 hours 3Tp Lt Burdon and 1Tp Sgt Beard moved to report on SIDI SULEIMAN and Italian camp area respectively. Lt Burdon kept touch with an enemy column retiring North towards CAPUZZO and Sgt Beard after reporting several small parties of MET between QUARET SHARQAN 520359 and the Italian camp, reported the area clear of the enemy. Both patrols pushed forward after the enemy and by 1030 hours had reached the wire. SHQ was moving up behind and at 1200 hours had reached BP 40, with Sgt Chambers patrolling to QABR MEDUAR 501376 and Lt Burdon patrolling to BIR HAFID and on to HAQFET UAR. Both patrols reported no movement seen in their area by 1300 hours. SHQ moved to BIR HAFID and by 1300 hours both patrols moved forward again to SIDI AZEIZ area. 1Tp Sgt Beard was at BP 38 and was rather mixed up with the enemy and friendly tanks. He was withdrawn to SHQ at 1330 hours. At 1340 hours 3Tp Lt Burdon patrolled to BIR BEDR and then East to QABR ARMAR and on to 50736 and remained there in observation of SIDI AZEIZ – BARDIA road. Patrols reported various MET moving in SIDI AZEIZ area and on the SIDI AZEIZ – BARDIA road. 5Tp Sgt Chambers patrolled to BIR BU TABIL and reported MET moving West along TRIGH CAPUZZO and at 1650 hours reported SIDI AZEIZ clear of enemy and took up a position of observation at 500357. At 1703 hours Sgt Chambers reported that he had been attacked by a Hurricane – Sgt Chambers, Tpr Fidler, Tpr Shrosbury and LCpl Strong wounded. LCpl Strong wounded in the ankle and Tpr Fidler in the leg. Tpr Shrosbury had splinters in his forehead. All three were evacuated to ADS. Sgt chambers was dressed by the MO and returned to the Sqn the same night. At 1705 hou |